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[507] 
Law, Race, and the Epistemology of Ignorance 
 
GEORGE A. MARTÍNEZ* 
 
Abstract 
 
Philosophers and other theorists have developed the field of 
epistemology which is the study of human knowledge. Critical race theorists 
have begun to explore how epistemological theory and insights may 
illuminate the study of race, including the analysis of race and the law. Such 
use of epistemology is appropriate because theoretical work on knowledge 
can be used to advance one of the key goals of critical race theory which is 
to understand how a regime of white supremacy and its subordination of 
people of color have been created and maintained in America. In this regard, 
philosophers and other theorists have recently begun to develop an 
“epistemology of ignorance” which is an examination of the complex 
phenomenon of ignorance that seeks to describe different forms of ignorance, 
examining how they are produced and sustained, and what role they play in 
knowledge practices. In particular, theorists have begun to apply an 
epistemology of ignorance to issues of race, racism and white privilege and 
are exploring how forms of ignorance operate in enabling racial oppression 
or domination. Legal scholars have begun to use some of the insights of the 
epistemology of ignorance in analyzing certain aspects of law and the legal 
profession. No one, however, has sought to examine the epistemology of 
ignorance at work in the area of race and law in as comprehensive a fashion 
as this article. This comprehensive treatment makes it possible to reveal the 
magnitude of the negative impact of the production of ignorance in the legal 
context on various racial minority groups. Accordingly, this article seeks to 
explore the epistemology of ignorance at work in the context of law and race 
and reveal how the production of ignorance has helped enable the dominant 
group to subordinate racial minorities in America 
 
 
 
 
 
* Professor of Law, Dedman School of Law at Southern Methodist University, B.A. Arizona 
State University; M.A. (Philosophy) University of Michigan; J.D. Harvard University. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Philosophers and other theorists have developed the field of 
“epistemology” which is “the study of human knowledge.”1  Critical race 
theorists have begun to explore how epistemological theory and insights may 
illuminate the study of race, including the analysis of race and the law.2  Such 
use of epistemology is appropriate because theoretical work on knowledge 
can be used to advance one of the key goals of critical race theory which is 
“to understand how a regime of white supremacy and its subordination of 
people of color have been created and maintained in America[.]”3  In this 
regard, philosophers and other theorists have recently begun to develop an 
“epistemology of ignorance” which “is an examination of the complex 
phenomenon of ignorance” that seeks to describe “different forms of 
ignorance, examining how they are produced and sustained, and what role 
 
1.  ROBERT C. SOLOMON, INTRODUCING PHILOSOPHY:  PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 95 
(2d ed. 1981). 
2.  See, e.g., George A. Martínez, Arizona, Immigration, and Latinos: The Epistemology 
of Whiteness, the Geography of Race Interest Convergence and the View from the Perspective 
of Critical Theory, 44 AZ. ST. L.J. 175 (2012). 
3.  KIMBERLÉ CRENSHAW ET. AL., CRITICAL RACE THEORY:  THE KEY WRITINGS THAT 
FORMED THE MOVEMENT XIII (1995). 
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they play in knowledge practices.”4  In particular, theorists have begun to 
apply “an epistemology of ignorance to issues of race, racism, and white 
privilege” and are exploring how forms of ignorance operate in enabling 
racial oppression or domination.5  Legal scholars have begun to use some of 
the insights of the epistemology of ignorance in analyzing certain aspects of 
law and the legal profession.6  No one, however, has sought to examine the 
epistemology of ignorance at work in the area of race and law in as 
comprehensive a fashion as this article.  This comprehensive treatment makes 
it possible to reveal the magnitude of the negative impact of the production 
of ignorance in the legal context on various racial minority groups.  
Accordingly, this article seeks to explore the epistemology of ignorance at 
work in the context of law and race and reveal how the production of 
ignorance has helped enable the dominant group to subordinate racial 
minorities in America. 
In Part II, the Article explains the leading ideas behind the epistemology 
of ignorance, which requires whites to misinterpret and misrepresent matters 
dealing with race in order to maintain their position as the dominant group.  
In Parts III–VIII, the Article sets out—through a series of important 
examples—how the dominant group has constructed an epistemology of 
ignorance in the area of race and law.  In particular, Sections III-VIII contend 
that the dominant group has constructed an epistemology of ignorance (1) in 
the area of law with respect to Native Americans; (2) in the area of law with 
respect to Mexican-Americans; (3) in the area of employment law; (4) in the 
area of immigration law and policy in the Trump era, including the Muslim 
Travel Ban Case and in the matter of child separation at the border; (5) in the 
area of Federalism in recent United States Supreme Court cases dealing with 
Medicaid expansion and voting rights; and (6) in the areas of legal 
scholarship and in the outlawing of ethnic studies in Arizona.  The Article 
argues that this production of ignorance has helped whites maintain their 
socially dominant position in the United States. 
 
 
 
 
4.  Shannon Sullivan & Nancy Tuana, Introduction, in RACE & EPISTEMOLOGIES OF 
IGNORANCE 1 (Shannon Sullivan & Nancy Tuana eds., 2007). 
5.  Id. 
6.  April Shaw, How Race-Selective and Sex-Selective Bans on Abortion Expose the 
Color-Coded Dimensions of the Right to Abortion and Deficiencies in Constitutional 
Protections for Women of Color, 40 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 545, 572 (2016) (using 
the epistemology of ignorance in analyzing women’s right to an abortion); Dermot Feenan, 
Understanding Disadvantage Partly through an Epistemology of Ignorance, 16 SOC. & LEGAL 
STUD. 509 (2007) (employing the epistemology of ignorance in studying the appointment of 
women judges). 
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II. THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF IGNORANCE 
 
Epistemologists of race have recognized that socially dominant groups 
do not necessarily have a privileged access to knowledge about the social 
world.7  As philosopher Charles Mills has explained: “[H]egemonic groups 
characteristically have experiences that foster illusory perceptions about 
society’s functioning whereas subordinate groups characteristically have 
experiences that (at least potentially) give rise to more adequate 
conceptualizations.”8 
In this regard and in the context of race, Charles Mills theorizes that 
there is a “Racial Contract” that governs race relations in society.9  This 
Racial Contract contains an epistemological provision which constitutes an 
agreement “about what counts as a correct, objective interpretation of the 
world . . . for agreeing to this view, one is (‘contractually’) granted full 
cognitive standing in the polity, the official epistemic community.”10  This 
“Racial Contract require[s] that whites engage in a significant degree of 
misunderstanding, misinterpretation and misrepresentation on matters related 
to race.”11  As a result, Mills contends that “[t]he Racial Contract prescribes 
for its signatories an inverted epistemology, an epistemology of ignorance, a 
particular pattern of localized and global cognitive dysfunctions (which are 
psychologically and socially functional), producing the ironic outcome that 
whites will in general be unable to understand the world they themselves have 
 
7.  Rebecca Mason, Two Kinds of Unknowing, 26 HYPATIA 294-307, 301 (2011).  “That 
is to say, although membership in a socially powerful group affords certain benefits, privileged 
social perception is not necessarily among them.  Although epistemic access is differentiated 
according to social location, powerful groups do not ipso facto get a better view.” Id. 
8.  CHARLES MILLS, BLACKNESS VISIBLE:  ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND RACE 28 (1998).  
Charles Mills has been a pioneer in analyzing the ways in which racial oppression is connected 
“to our conceptions and productions of knowledge.”  Sullivan & Tuana, supra note 4, at 2. 
9.  See CHARLES MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT (Cornell University Press, 1997).  See 
also Mason, supra note 7, at 301-02. “Mills introduces the notion of the ‘Racial Contract’ as 
a way to challenge the assumptions of white political philosophy . . .  Mills’s framework is 
conducive to discussions of race and white racism that structure society as we think we know 
it.  Thus instead of focusing on a forward-looking, ideal contract that purports to describe the 
structure of a perfectly just society in which we would like to live, Mills focuses on a historical, 
non-ideal contract that describes the origin and nature of the unjust society in which we 
currently live.”  Id. 
10.  MILLS, supra note 9, at 18. 
11.  Mason, supra note 7, at 302.  See also Alison Bailey, Strategic Ignorance, in RACE 
& EPISTEMOLOGIES OF IGNORANCE, supra note 4, at 77, 80.  “Implicit agreement to 
misrepresent the world is coupled with constant pressure to accept these counterfeit images as 
real currency . . .  This steady parade of misrepresentations generates a racialized moral 
psychology in which white perception and conception, memory, experience and testimony are 
shaped by a willful and habitual inversion of reality.” Id.  See also Linda Martín Alcoff, 
Epistemologies of Ignorance:  Three Types, in RACE & EPISTEMOLOGIES OF IGNORANCE, supra 
note 4, at 39, 40.  “[O]ppressive systems produce ignorance as one of their effects.” Id. 
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made.”12  This “white ignorance” “is the product of an epistemic agreement 
among whites to see the world wrongly—that is, to cultivate and sustain a 
system of false beliefs.”13  Such ignorance enables whites to maintain their 
socially dominant position with respect to racial minorities.14  Indeed, white 
ignorance is “linked with white supremacy,” it “distorts reality,” and 
“supports a delusion of white racial superiority.”15 
Epistemologists of race seek to bring to light and uncover: 
 
[W]hat Mills has called a “racial fantasyland” that undergirds 
white dominance and privilege.  This fantasyland constitutes the 
epistemology of ignorance that prevents whites from perceiving 
the reality and effects of their own beliefs concerning racial 
difference.  Such cognitive blindness requires fundamental 
revision, for it rests on what Mills calls a “consensual 
hallucination,” an invented delusional world where white moral 
consciousness is filtered by norms of social cognition that derive 
from an unconscious sense of dominance in the world.16 
 
12.  MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT, supra note 9, at 18.  See also Sullivan & Tuana, 
supra note 4, at 2.  “For Mills, the epistemology of ignorance is part of a white supremacist 
state in which the human race is racially divided into full persons and subpersons.  Even 
though—or, more accurately, precisely because—they tend not to understand the racist world 
in which they live, white people are able to fully benefit from its racial hierarchies, ontologies, 
and economies.” Id. 
13.  Mason, supra note 7, at 302.  See also Charles Mills, White Ignorance, in RACE & 
EPISTEMOLOGIES OF IGNORANCE, supra note 4, at 11, 16.  Mills uses “ignorance to cover both 
false belief and the absence of true belief.” Id. 
14.  Mason, supra note 7, at 302.  See also Martín Alcoff, supra note 11, at 48. Alcoff 
interprets Mills’s argument as follows: 
1. One of the key features of oppressive societies is that they do not acknowledge 
themselves as oppressive.  Therefore, in any given oppressive society, there is a 
dominant view about the general nature of society that represents its particular forms 
of inequality and exploitation as basically just and fair, or at least the best of all 
possible worlds. 
2. It is very likely, however, that the dominant representation of the unjust society as a 
just society will have countervailing evidence on a daily basis that is at least 
potentially visible to everyone in the society. 
3. Therefore, cognitive forms of assessment will have to be maintained that allow for 
this countervailing evidence to be regularly dismissed so that the dominant view can 
be held stable.  
15.  Sullivan & Tuana, supra note 4, at 3. 
16.  Dan Flory, The Epistemology of Race and Black American Film Noir:  Spike Lee’s 
Summer of Sam as Lynching Parable, reprinted in SPIKE LEE READER 196, 201 (Paula Massood 
ed., 2008).  See also Martín Alcoff, supra note 11, at 49. “Mills suggests that ‘whiteness,’ 
which he carefully defines as a political construct rather than simply an ethnic category, brings 
with it a ‘cognitive model that precludes self-transparency and genuine understanding of all 
social realities,’ that it ensures that whites will live in a ‘racial fantasyland, [or] a consensual 
hallucination,’ and that the root of all this is the ‘cognitive and moral economy psychically 
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In this paper, I seek to reveal the epistemology of ignorance or “racial 
fantasyland” at work in the area of law. 
 
III.      LAW, THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF IGNORANCE AND 
NATIVE AMERICANS 
 
The dominant group has constructed an epistemology of ignorance with 
respect to Native 
Americans.  The dominant group has engaged in “misunderstanding, 
misinterpretation and misrepresentation” on matters related to Native 
Americans and the law.  They have created a racial fantasyland with respect 
to Native Americans which has helped the dominant group to maintain their 
socially dominant position just as predicted by theorists of the epistemology 
of ignorance. 
With respect to Native Americans, a key way the epistemology of 
ignorance has been constructed has been for the courts to misdescribe and 
misrepresent Native Americans as warlike savages.17  For example, in an 
1835 case, State v. Foreman,18 the Tennessee Supreme Court described and 
justified the White European settlement of the United States as follows: 
 
[T]he principle by which the country was taken possession of, 
was the only rule of action possible to be observed . . . it was 
more just the country should be peopled by Europeans, than 
continue the haunt of savage beasts, and of men yet more fierce 
and savage, who, ‘if they might not be extirpated for their want 
of religion and just morals, they might be reclaimed for their 
errors’ . . . [a] rule of which savages of the description have no 
just right to complain.19 
 
The Court also observed that the Native Americans of the “immense 
 
required for conquest, colonization, and enslavement.’” Id. 
17.  See Ann E. Tweedy, “Hostile Indian Tribes . . . Outlaws, . . . Wolves, . . . Bears . . . 
Grizzlies and Things Like That?”  How the Second Amendment and Supreme Court Precedent 
Target Tribal Self-Defense, 13 U. PENN. J. CONST. L. 687, 709-23, 710 (2011).  “Nonetheless, 
the notion of Indians as warlike savages, which was based in large part on the historical myth 
of the savage war, survived and lives on even now in the collective memory and in case law 
defining Indians as such and using their alleged savagery to justify deprivations of tribes’ 
sovereign rights.” Id.; WALTER R. ECHO-HAWK, IN THE COURTS OF THE CONQUEROR:  THE TEN 
WORST INDIAN LAW CASES EVER DECIDED 41 (2010). “Thus, in the important cases defining 
Native American Rights, the decisions branded Indians as savages—that is, brutish people 
who lack attributes normal to civilized human beings—and treated them accordingly.” Id.; 
Mills, White Ignorance, supra note 13, at 11, 26-27. 
18.  16 Tenn. 256 (1835). 
19.  Foreman, 16 Tenn. at 265; Tweedy, supra note 17, at 712-13. 
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west and northwest” were “[t]ribes that subsist on raw flesh, and are savage 
as the most savage beasts that infest that mighty wilderness.”20  Similarly, the 
highest territorial court of Idaho observed in 1874 that “the whole country” 
was “inhabited by wild and barbarous savages.”21  Likewise, the Nevada high 
court opined in 1883 that “[i]n 1861, the Indians here were savages in name 
and fact” and that they “killed inoffensive white men.”22  Indeed, the early 
American “case law monolithically portrays the tribes, many of whom were 
presumably fighting to retain their lands, as savage aggressors.”23 
The use of such language misdescribing and misrepresenting Native 
Americans as savages, implicating the epistemology of ignorance, enabled 
the dominant group to subordinate Native Americans.  For instance, during 
the so-called “heroic age of the Supreme Court,” Native Americans “lost 
more times than not, at a ratio in fact of 2 to 1” at a time “when the greatest 
chief justice of all time talked about them [as savages in] this way.”24  Even 
after the 1954 landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Brown v. 
Board of Education,25 overturning legally compelled segregation of African-
Americans, the Supreme Court continued to misdescribe and misrepresent 
Native Americans “as culturally and racially inferior wandering ignorant 
savages[.]”26  For instance, in Tee-Hit Ton v. United States,27 a case decided 
one year after Brown, the Supreme Court stated: 
 
Every American school boy knows that the savage tribes of this 
continent were deprived of their ancestral ranges by force and that 
even when the Indians ceded millions of acres by treaty in return 
for blankets, food and trinkets, it was not a sale but the 
conquerors’ will that deprived them of their land.28 
 
In Tee-Hit-Ton, “the Court uses the language of savagery” to support its 
 
20.  Id. at 713. 
21.  Pickett v. United States, 1 Idaho 523, 530 (1874); Tweedy, supra note 17, at 714. 
22.  State ex rel. Truman v. McKenney, 2 P. 171, 179 (1883); Tweedy, supra note 17, at 
714. 
23.  Id. 
24.  ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON:  THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN 
RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA xviii (2005).  See also ECHO-HAWK, 
supra note 17, at 5 (describing a movement among “legal scholars who present a powerful 
case for decolonizing federal Indian law and confronting the Supreme Court about its 
continued use of legal precedent tainted with racism . . . [who question whether] legal 
advocates [can] expect to win lawsuits by citing cases that call Native Americans ‘savages’ 
and by relying upon legal principles founded on the racial inferiority of their clients”). 
25.  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
26.  WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at xxi. 
27.  348 U.S. 272, 289-90 (1955). 
28.  348 U.S. at 289-90. 
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holding “that the Tee-Hit-Ton tribe was not entitled to Fifth Amendment 
compensation” because the “tribes generally have lost their lands to the 
United States through conquest rather than arms-length transactions.”29 
Similarly, in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,30 a decision handed 
down in 1978, the Supreme Court held that “an Indian Tribe lacks criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians committing crimes on its reservation,” and 
therefore Indian courts had no power to judge white Americans.31  In 
justifying its conclusion that the rights of Native Americans are inferior to 
those of whites, the Oliphant court relied on an 1891 case, In re Mayfield,32 
and “its blatantly racist nineteenth-century judicial language of Indian 
savagery and white supremacy”33 and explained: 
 
In In re Mayfield, the court noted that the policy of Congress had 
been to allow the inhabitants of the Indian Country ‘such power 
of self-government as was thought to be consistent with the safety 
of the white population with which they may come in contact, and 
to encourage them as far as possible in raising themselves to our 
standard of civilization.’34 
 
This misdescription and misrepresentation of Native Americans as 
savages has enabled the dominant group to maintain its socially dominant 
position.  As Robert Williams has explained: “The racist precedents and 
language of Indian savagery used and relied upon by the justices throughout 
this ongoing historical period of legalized racial dictatorship have most often 
worked . . . to justify the denial to Indians of important rights of property, 
self-government, and cultural survival.”35 
 
29.  Tweedy, supra note 17, at 721. 
30.  435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
31.  WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at xxiii.  See also ECHO-HAWK, supra note 17, at 21. In 
Oliphant, “the Court refused to let tribal courts try whites for crimes committed on Indian 
reservations.  Even though tribal courts are as sophisticated as any other court, Justice 
Rehnquist’s opinion severely restricted their reach.  Tribal courts are not really a part of the 
American judicial system, because tribes lost their sovereignty and gave up ‘their power to try 
non-Indian citizens.’  Under the colonial structure, only the courts of the conqueror may judge 
a white man and tribal government tribunals cannot sit in judgment of white citizens.” Id. 
32.  141 U.S. 107 (1891). 
33.  WILLIAMS, supra note 24 at xxiii. 
34.  Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 204. 
35.  WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at xxv.  See also Tweedy, supra note 17, at 739. “These 
precedents denied tribes sovereign rights based in large part on the implicit justification of 
Indian savagery.  When these precedents are relied upon now, they are expanded . . . to justify 
even greater incursions upon tribal sovereignty.” Id.; ECHO-HAWK, supra note 17, at 41. 
“Many cases affecting Native Americans have produced stark injustices . . . . Those cases 
usually describe Indians as ‘inferior,’ ‘ignorant,’ ‘savages,’ heathens,’ or ‘uncivilized’.” Id. 
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IV.      LAW, THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF IGNORANCE AND 
MEXICAN-AMERICANS 
 
The dominant group also has engaged in the epistemology of ignorance 
regarding Mexican-Americans.  They have misunderstood, misinterpreted, 
and misrepresented various issues regarding Mexican-Americans and the 
law.  This construction of a racial fantasyland with respect to Mexican-
Americans has also helped the dominant group to maintain a socially 
dominant position in American society. 
For example, one of the ways Mexican-Americans were misinterpreted 
to their disadvantage was to misconstruct the racial identity36 of Mexican-
Americans as white for purposes of determining whether they were 
adequately represented on juries in criminal trials.  In Hernandez v. Texas,37 
an all-white jury convicted a Mexican-American man, Pete Hernandez, of 
murder.38  He sought to reverse his conviction on appeal on the ground that 
Mexican-Americans had been excluded from the jury.39  He supported his 
argument by citing cases that had held that excluding African-Americans 
 
36.  “Today the very idea of a racial identity trial may seem bizarre.  Trials involving 
racial identity, however, were common occurrences in local American courts from their 
beginnings in the late eighteenth century well into the twentieth century, encompassing people 
of European, African, Asian, Mexican, and Native American ancestry from the deep South to 
the industrial North to the far West.”  ARIELA J. GROSS, WHAT BLOOD WON’T TELL: A HISTORY 
OF RACE ON TRIAL IN AMERICA 3 (2008). 
37.  251 S.W. 2d 531 (Tex. Crim. App. 1952).  For more on Hernandez, see “COLORED 
MEN” AND “HOMBRES AQUÍ”: HERNANDEZ V. TEXAS AND THE EMERGENCE OF MEXICAN-
AMERICAN LAWYERING (Michael A. Olivas ed., 2006); Ian Haney López & Michael A. Olivas, 
Jim Crow, Mexican-Americans and the Anti-Subordination Constitution: The Story of 
Hernandez v. Texas, in RACE LAW STORIES 273 (Rachel F. Moran & Devon W. Carbado eds., 
2008); Kevin R. Johnson, Hernandez v. Texas: Legacies of Justice and Injustice, 25 CHICANO-
LATINO L. REV. 153 (2005); Steven H. Wilson, Brown over “Other White”: Mexican 
Americans’ Legal Arguments and Litigation Strategy in School Desegregation Lawsuits, 21 
LAW & HIST. REV. 145 (2003). 
38.  See Haney López & Olivas, supra note 37, at 280-81.  “Between October 8 and 11, 
1951, Hernandez was tried by an all-white jury” and “on October 11, 1951,” he was found 
guilty of murder and sentenced to life in prison. Id. 
39.  See Haney López & Olivas, supra note 37, at 276. “The central legal claim in 
Hernandez was whether Mexican Americans were entitled to a ‘jury of their peers’ that 
included other Mexican-Americans.” Id.  “To the extent it was important to litigate the racial 
exclusivity of the jury system in Texas, the facts of Hernandez were perfect:  In a county more 
than 14% Mexican-American, there had been no Hispanic jurors in over a quarter century.”  
Id. at 284.  See also Wilson, supra note 37, at 161. “To support their contention that the 
exclusion of Mexican-Americans from the juries must have been deliberate, Cadena and 
Garcia obtained a stipulation from the state and county attorneys that there were males of 
‘Mexican or Latin American’ descent in Jackson County who were eligible to serve as 
members of either a commission or a jury.  The state and county attorneys also agreed to 
stipulate that, at least during the previous twenty-five years, no one with a Spanish surname 
had served on a jury commission, grand jury, or petit jury in Jackson County.” Id. 
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from juries violated the constitution’s guarantee of due process and equal 
protection and contended that the exclusion of Mexican-Americans should 
similarly amount to a constitutional violation.40  The court responded to the 
argument by observing that the Fourteenth Amendment protects only two 
groups of people:  blacks and whites.  The court held that Mexican-
Americans were white persons for purposes of the equal protection and due 
process clauses.41  Moreover, since the juries that had indicted and convicted 
the defendant were comprised of white people, there was no equal protection 
violation.42 
In Hernandez, then, Mexican-Americans were misrepresented or 
misconstrued as white and were unable to assert a distinctive non-white 
identity which might have offered more protection on the jury.  As a result of 
this misrepresentation, the Fourteenth Amendment provided no protection 
for Mexican-Americans and the dominant group was able to exclude them 
from juries. 
The Hernandez case is consistent with earlier Court of Criminal Appeals 
of Texas decisions holding that Mexican-Americans were white for purposes 
of jury selection.  For example, in Sanchez v. State,43 the defendant Anecito 
Sanchez was convicted of murder and was sentenced to ten years in prison.  
On appeal, Sanchez argued that he had been convicted in “violation of the 
due process clause in that there was a continual and uninterrupted practice in 
Fort Bend County of discriminating against Mexican-Americans as a race . . . 
in the selection of grand jury commissioners and grand jurors.”44  The Court 
held that there was no constitutional violation because Mexican-Americans 
“are not a separate race but are white people of Spanish descent, as has often 
been said by this court.”45  Accordingly, the Court stated that “[w]e find no 
ground for discussing the question further and the complaint raised by this 
 
40.  See Wilson, supra note 37, at 162.  “When they presented the case before the Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals, Cadena and Garcia sought to appropriate a ‘rule of exclusion’ that 
the U.S. Supreme Court had announced in Norris v. Alabama (1935).  Alabama’s State 
Supreme Court had let stand the conviction of Clarence Norris—one of nine black’s 
‘Scottsboro Boys’ who had been convicted of the rape of two white women—despite the 
exclusion of African-Americans from both the grand and petit juries.  The U.S. Supreme Court 
had reversed, ruling that state action, whether by the legislative court or executive, to exclude 
from jury service ‘all persons of the African race, solely because of their race or color’ when 
the same were both available and qualified to serve, had denied ‘a person of the African race’ 
the equal protection of the laws and was contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment.  Cadena and 
Garcia sought to persuade the Texas court to apply this reasoning to Mexican Americans.” Id. 
41.  Hernandez, 251 S.W.2d at 536. 
42.  Id. 
43.  156 Tex. Crim. 468 (1951). 
44.  156 Tex. Crim. at 469. 
45.  156 Tex. Crim. at 469.  See also Johnson, supra note 37, at 172 (observing that 
historically “Mexican American litigants found it difficult to prevail in cases seeking to 
vindicate their civil rights because of the law’s classification of Mexicans as white”). 
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bill will not be sustained.”46 
That this was a misconstrual of the race of Mexican-Americans is 
revealed in affidavits collected by Alonso Perales, a pioneering civil rights 
attorney, during roughly the same time period as the Hernandez and Sanchez 
cases which show that Mexican-Americans were not treated or viewed as 
white in every day encounters.47  For instance, a Mexican-American named 
Ernesto Perez stated in his sworn affidavit that on June 21, 1943, he was told 
by an usher at a movie theater in Hondo, Texas, that he not allowed to sit in 
the center or middle section of the theater because it “was for white people 
only” and that another part of the theater “was reserved for Mexicans.”48  
Perez informed the usher that “[Perez] was classified as white by the United 
States Government in Washington. . . .”49  Perez then appealed to the 
manager of the theatre who told Perez that “No, you are not white; you are a 
Mexican.”50  Similarly, Jesus Valdez stated in a sworn affidavit, dated June 
26, 1941, that he did construction work at a location where “drinking pails” 
were designated “as follows: ‘For Whites;’ ‘For Mexicans;’ and ‘For 
Negroes.’”51  When Valdez took a drink of water out of a pail marked “For 
Whites,” the foreman terminated his employment “because [Valdez] had 
drunk water out of the pail marked ‘For Whites.’”  In defense, Valdez told 
the foreman that: 
 
I considered myself as white as he or any other person.  [The 
foreman] then said substantially the following:  “You are 
discharged, and any other person of Mexican or African descent 
who drinks water out of the pails marked “For Whites” will be 
discharged also.52 
 
Similarly, a “1950 survey” of white Texans published in a leading Texas 
 
46.  156 Tex. Crim. at 469.  See also GROSS, supra note 36, at 282. “In its Sanchez ruling 
the Court of Criminal Appeals berated the two lawyers for their ‘exhaustive brief’ . . . citing 
cases which, either intentionally or loosely refer to Mexican people as a different race.” Id. 
47.  For more on Alonso Perales, see IN DEFENSE OF MY PEOPLE: ALONSO S. PERALES 
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF MEXICAN-AMERICAN PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS (Michael A. Olivas, 
ed., 2012). 
48.  ALONSO S. PERALES, ARE WE GOOD NEIGHBORS? 194 (1974). 
49.  PERALES, supra note 48, at 194. 
50.  PERALES, supra note 48, at 194. 
51.  PERALES, supra note 48, at 211. 
52.  PERALES, supra note 48, at 211.  See also DAVID MONTEJANO, ANGLOS AND 
MEXICANS IN THE MAKING OF TEXAS, 1836-1986 265 (1987). “The ‘Latin American’ and black 
workers were not permitted to use the drinking fountains or the toilets and bathing facilities 
provided for Anglos.  Nor were they permitted to punch the same time clock or receive their 
pay through the same window used by Anglos.” Id. 
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newspaper showed that such whites “viewed Mexicans as a different race.”53  
The survey reported that Anglo Texans “make no effort to cover up their 
prejudices against Latin-Americans” and feared “race mixing” with 
Mexicans.54 
As predicted by the epistemology of ignorance, the misconstrual of 
Mexican-Americans as white enabled whites to maintain their dominant 
position in society.  The dominant group was able to exclude Mexican-
Americans from juries and thereby subordinate Mexican-Americans through 
unjust or unfair jury convictions and by protecting whites in jury trials from 
Mexican-Americans attempting to assert their rights.55  Indeed, as Professors 
Haney Lopez and Olivas have explained: 
 
[i]n the context of Texas race politics . . . to put Mexican 
Americans on juries was tantamount to elevating such persons to 
equal status with whites.  The idea that ‘Mexicans’ might judge 
whites deeply violated Texas’s racial caste system—and placing 
Mexican-Americans on juries became critical to the caste 
system’s demise. . . . [and putting an end to] a key pillar of Jim 
Crow:  the belief that whites should judge all but be judged by 
none but themselves.56 
 
Beyond the exclusion from juries, in the not-too-distant past, Mexican-
Americans along with other racial minorities faced a general Jim Crow form 
of oppression and were therefore segregated and excluded from taking part 
in dominant white or Anglo society.57  Indeed, as Richard Valencia has 
 
53.  GROSS, supra note 36, at 269. 
54.  GROSS, supra note 36, at 269. 
55.  See Haney López & Olivas, supra note 37, at 284. “To be sure, all-white juries 
imperiled Mexican-American defendants who, like Hernandez himself, risked hostile and 
biased convictions.  Moreover, the Mexican-American community suffered because white 
juries rarely and reluctantly convicted whites for depredations against Mexican-Americans.” 
Id.; Johnson, supra note 37, at 182-83. “Latina/o underrepresentation on juries can be expected 
to have substantive impacts.  In the 1960s, Chicano activist attorney Oscar “Zeta” Acosta 
challenged the grand jury system in Los Angeles County by defending Chicana/o political 
activists charged with criminal offenses just as the League of United Latin American Citizens 
did on behalf of Pete Hernandez and Mexican Americans in Hernandez v. Texas.  The unstated 
hope was that the inclusion of Latina/os on grand juries would affect the outcome of cases.  At 
a minimum, the parties sought a more impartial jury that would not hold Mexican ancestry 
against Mexican defendants.” Id. 
56.  Haney López & Olivas, supra note 37, at 284.  See also Johnson, supra note 37, at 
182. “As Hernandez v. Texas exemplifies, discrimination in the selection of petit and grand 
juries has long plagued Mexican-Americans in the United States.  Exclusion of Latina/os from 
jury service historically has denoted the subordinated status of Latina/os in American social 
life.” Id. 
57.  See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 110 (3d ed. 1992). “[N]o 
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observed: 
 
As a colonized people, Mexican Americans faced segregation in, 
or exclusion from, for example, movie theatres, restaurants, and 
public accommodations (e.g., swimming pools). . . .  For many 
Mexican Americans, segregation spanned from the ‘cradle to the 
grave.’  There was forced segregation in maternity wards and 
separate cemetaries for whites and Mexican Americans. . . .  The 
treatment of Mexican Americans as nonpeers allowed whites to 
maintain their system of privilege and domination.58 
 
Such segregation was so all encompassing and oppressive that it seemed 
to create separate worlds for Mexican-Americans and whites.  David 
Montejano explains: 
 
On the social plane, the rules of etiquette served to acknowledge 
Anglo superiority before the Mexican.  Mexicans were expected, 
according to a historical account of a Winter Garden county to 
have a ‘deferential posture and respectful voice tone’ whenever in 
the presence of Anglos.  All contact between American and 
Mexican followed rather explicit rules.  Movie houses, drugstores, 
restaurants, retail stores, banks, schools, and so on—the 
institutions of ‘modernity’—had brought with them definitions of 
the ‘proper place’ of Mexicans.  Public buildings were seen as 
‘Anglo territories,’ Mexican women were ‘only supposed to shop 
on the Anglo side of town on Saturdays, preferably during the 
early hours when Anglos were not shopping’:  Mexicans were 
allowed only counter and carry-out service at Anglo cafés and all 
Mexicans were expected to be back in Mexican town by sunset.  
So completely segregated were the two towns that, in effect, ‘there 
was an Anglo world and a Mexicano world’ whose main point of 
contact was the ‘dusty fields.’59 
 
 
detail was too small in the frantic effort to seal off contact between blacks and whites . . . The 
law had created two worlds so separate that communication between them was almost 
impossible.” Id.; MONTEJANO, supra note 52, at 160. “The modern order framed Mexican-
Anglo relations in stark ‘Jim Crow’ segregation.  Separate quarters for Mexican and Anglo 
were to be found in the farm towns.  Specific rules defined the proper place of Mexicans and 
regulated interracial contact.  The separation was so complete and seemingly absolute that 
several observers have described the farm society as ‘castelike’.” Id. 
58.  RICHARD R. VALENCIA, CHICANO STUDENTS AND THE COURTS: THE MEXICAN 
AMERICAN LEGAL STRUGGLE FOR EDUCATIONAL EQUALITY 7 (2008). 
59.  MONTEJANO, supra note 52, at 168. 
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One of the most damaging aspects of this system of Jim Crow was the 
segregation of Mexican-American children in the public schools.60  Such 
segregation clearly revealed the: 
 
Intent of [white] farm settlers to build separate institutions for the 
races. . . .  The farm settlers understood well the potentially 
corrosive force of ‘educating Mexicans’ for the maintenance of 
their divided world.  The divisions of the racial order made little 
sense if Mexicans were better educated than some Anglos or if 
both were ‘mixed’ in schools.  Educating the Mexican also raised 
the danger that Mexicans might seek ‘social equality’. . . .61 
 
Mexican-Americans challenged such school segregation in the courts.62  
These cases implicate the epistemology of ignorance.  For example, the court 
misconstrued reality in an historic Texas desegregation case.  In Independent 
School Dist. v. Salvatierra,63 Mexican-American plaintiffs challenged the 
segregation of Mexican-American children in the public schools in Del Rio, 
Texas.  The League of United Latin American citizens (LULAC)64 initiated 
this law suit “as a test case intended to bring an end to segregation in 
Texas.”65  The school district was segregating Mexican-American children in 
 
60.  See GROSS, supra note 36, at 267. “In Texas in the 1930s and 1940s, as in much of 
the Southwest and California, most Mexican American children attended separate schools; 
indeed by 1930, 90 percent of all south Texas schools were segregated.” Id. 
61.  MONTEJANO, supra note 52, at 191. 
62.  See GROSS, supra note 36, at 269. “Thus, in Texas and California, Mexican 
Americans suffered many of the Jim Crow practices endured by African Americans there and 
in the South.  And, like blacks, they responded to racial injustice by organizing, petitioning, 
and litigating.” Id.; BRIAN D. BEHNKEN, FIGHTING THEIR OWN BATTLES:  MEXICAN 
AMERICANS, AFRICAN AMERICANS, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN TEXAS 3 (2011). 
“Much like their African American counterparts, Mexican American civil rights activists 
focused on military service and lawsuits to challenge the segregation of Mexican origin 
people.” Id. 
63.  33 S.W.2d 790 (1930).  “This [Salvatierra] case was the first Mexican American 
desegregation lawsuit in the State of Texas.”  VALENCIA, supra note 58, at 15. 
64.  For more on LULAC, see CYNTHIA E. OROZCO, NO MEXICANS, WOMEN OR DOGS 
ALLOWED:  THE RISE OF THE MEXICAN AMERICAN CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2009).  “In this 
social, political, legal and diplomatic context, Mexican Americans organized a number of civic 
groups that were specifically formed to fight discriminatory practices against their own 
community.  Business leaders created the League of United Latin American Citizens . . . in 
1929, for example, at the height of a nativist movement in the U.S. that fostered the revival of 
the Ku Klux Klan and led the federal government to create a comprehensive regime of 
immigration controls.  The founders of LULAC aimed to integrate Mexican-descended 
persons into the U.S. mainstream, that is, to “Americanize’ the community.  LULAC’s 
constitution called for members to be loyal citizens.  It also stressed the importance of learning 
English.”  Wilson, supra note 37, at 154. 
65.  VALENCIA, supra note 58, at 16.  See also CARLOS KEVIN BLANTON, THE STRANGE 
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the first three grades in a separate school building.  The white children were 
taught in a separate school.  The school district claimed that it segregated the 
Mexican-American children because they started school late since they were 
migrant farm workers and because of linguistic problems arising out of the 
assertion that they spoke Spanish and not English.66  The court ruled: 
 
That the school authorities have no power to arbitrarily segregate 
Mexican children, assign them to separate schools, and exclude 
them from schools maintained for children of other white races, 
merely or solely because they are Mexicans.  An unlawful 
segregation will be effectuated if the rules for segregation are 
arbitrary and are applied indiscriminately to all Mexican pupils in 
those grades without regard to their individual aptitudes or 
attainments, while relieving children of other white races from the 
operation of the rules, even though some of them, as for instance, 
those who tardily enter the terms, may be subject to the 
classification given the Mexican children.  To the extent that the 
classification is arbitrarily imposed upon those of one race, but 
relaxed in its application to those of other races so as to exclude 
the latter from its operation, it constitutes an unlawful racial 
discrimination.67 
 
The court ruled that it could not say that the district’s reason for 
segregating the Mexican-American children was “unreasonable, if 
impartially applied to all students alike. . . .  To the extent that the plan 
adopted is applied in good faith . . . with no intent or effect to discriminate 
against any of the races involved, it cannot be said that the plan is unlawful 
or violative even of the spirit of the constitution.”68  The court then held that 
the plaintiffs had no right of action “[s]ince it has not been shown in this case 
that the school authorities are at this time enforcing unlawful segregation 
against any particular child or children, or intends to do so, or that the 
 
CAREER OF BILINGUAL EDUCATION IN TEXAS, 1836-1981 95 (2004). “Litigated by LULAC 
attorneys, the Salvatierra case first challenged the segregation of Mexican American children 
in Texas and the American Southwest.” Id. 
66.  Id. at 17. “Rather, the basis for the separation lay on two educational grounds.  First, 
the superintendent noted that about half of the Mexican-American children joined their parents 
in the migratory stream of picking cotton and working on ranches during part of the school 
year.  As a result, the superintendent added, the children upon return to school were several 
months ‘retarded from the standpoint of enrollment,’ and thus for the children to receive 
efficient instruction they needed to be segregated in the Mexican school.  Second, the 
superintendent testified that the Mexican American children required segregated instruction 
because of language needs.” Id. 
67.  Salvatierra, 33 S.W. 2d at 795. 
68.  Id. 
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individual complainants are suffering or threatened with injury and damage 
peculiar to themselves . . .”69 
The court seems to misdescribe and misinterpret the situation.  There 
was a good argument that the reasons offered by the district for segregation 
were pretextual and that in fact the discrimination was based on race and 
therefore was unlawful and arbitrary.  For instance, the Superintendent 
testified that he did not segregate the white children who started school late 
into the school for the Mexican-American children.70  Moreover, the 
Superintendent based segregation on the fact that the Mexican-American 
children spoke Spanish even though he admitted in his testimony that “the 
best way to learn a language is to be associated with the people who speak 
that language.”71  This would have meant that the Spanish speaking children 
should have been integrated into the school for white children so that the 
Mexican-American children would have the best prospects for learning 
English.  Thus, “[i]n Salvatierra, the educational justification for the 
segregation of the Mexican American was merely a smoke screen for the 
school board’s race based opposition to mixing young Mexican American 
and white children in the same classroom.”72 
Just as Charles Mill’s theory would predict, the court seems to have been 
constructing a racial fantasyland where racial discrimination did not exist 
even though there was evidence indicating the presence of discrimination 
based on race.  The court seemed unable to perceive this reality as it observed: 
It is to the credit of both races that notwithstanding widely diverse racial 
characteristics, they dwell together in friendship, peace, and unity, and work 
amicably together for the common good and a common country.  Racial 
dissensions, if any occur, are so rare and slight as to escape public notice, and 
we look in vain into the law books for evidences of such dissensions.  It is a 
matter of pride and gratification in our great public educational system and 
its administration that the question of race segregation, as between Mexicans 
and other white races, has not heretofore found its way into the courts of this 
state, and therefore the decision of no Texas court is available in the 
 
69.  Id. at 796. 
70.  33 S.W. 2d at 793. 
71.  Id. 
72.  VALENCIA, supra note 58, at 18.  See also GROSS, supra note 36, at 255. “Unlike 
earlier trials, these twentieth century trials were less the genuine efforts of a white society to 
determine what race was and how it should be treated than the strategic attempts of a self-
consciously racist society to segregate a group perceived as nonwhite without admitting that 
the segregation was based on race per se.  In the court records, unself-consciously racist 
statements sit side by side with elaborate efforts to deny racial prejudice, and the court actors 
seem less concerned with understanding race than with finding acceptable ways to enforce the 
racial views they already held.” Id. 
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disposition of the precise question presented here.73 
Contrary to the court’s description of alleged racial harmony in Texas, 
Texas was, in fact, well-known for its racism against Mexican-Americans.  
As Professor Kevin Johnson has explained: 
 
Although not alone in discriminating against persons of Mexican 
ancestry, Texas earned a reputation for its multi-racial caste 
system.  Indeed, in negotiating the agreements with the United 
States creating the Bracero Program, the Mexican government 
initially insisted on barring temporary workers from employment 
in Texas because of the notorious discrimination against persons 
of Mexican ancestry in the Lone Star State.74 
 
Significantly, the epistemological mischaracterization of Mexican-
Americans as white, as we observed in the context of jury selection, was also 
used to subordinate Mexican-Americans in the context of school segregation.  
School districts “cynically employed ‘Mexican Americans’ status as ‘white’ 
to ‘desegregate’ black schools by integrating them with Mexican 
Americans—much as the courts of the 1940s had cynically relied on 
Mexicans’ ‘whiteness’ to deny their civil rights claims.”75  Historian Brian 
Behnken explains how this “integration” and “desegregation” worked: [since 
the school district] still classified Mexican Americans as white, by pairing 
[Mexican American] schools and black schools the district achieved 
‘integration.’ [Mexican Americans] would serve as symbolic ‘whites’ for 
desegregation purposes—‘pawns, puppets, and scapegoats’ as one activist 
put it—thereby ensuring that predominantly Anglo schools remained white.76 
 
V.      EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND THE 
EPISTEMOLOGY OF IGNORANCE 
 
With respect to the epistemology of ignorance, “a lack of knowledge . . . 
often is actively [or consciously] produced for purposes of domination and 
exploitation.”77  Sometimes the ignorance is unconsciously produced.78 
One of the areas where there is evidence of the epistemology of 
ignorance being used against racial minorities in law is in the context of 
 
73.  Salvatierra, 33 S.W. 2d at 794. 
74.  Johnson, supra note 37, at 155-56.  See also BEHNKEN, supra note 62, at 28 (“The 
Mexican Jim Crow also threatened to undermine the Bracero Program.  Indeed, due to 
segregation the Mexican government banned braceros from working in Texas”). 
75.  GROSS, supra note 36, at 289. 
76.  BEHNKEN, supra note 62, at 200.  
77.  Sullivan & Tuana, supra note 4, at 1. 
78.  Id. at 1-2. 
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employment discrimination lawsuits.  In this connection, “Section 703 of 
Title VII prohibits employers from failing or refusing to hire, or from 
discharging or otherwise discriminating against any individual because of his 
or her race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”79  In the context of an 
employment discrimination lawsuit, once a plaintiff has made a prima facie 
case80 of employment discrimination, the defendant must produce a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action.81  Once the 
defendant has produced such a reason, plaintiff must prove that the reason or 
reasons are merely pretextual and the true reason is discriminatory.82 
One way that the epistemology of ignorance arises in the area of 
employment law, then, is that defendants will often give reasons for their 
actions which are not the real or true reasons for their actions—i.e., as 
predicted by the epistemology of ignorance, they will misdescribe or 
misrepresent reality.  Consider some examples of this misdescription or 
cover-up of the true reasons for employer actions.83 
 
79.  Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach 
to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1168 (1995). 
80.  “The McDonnell Douglas-Burdine prima facie case merely attempts to ‘rule out the 
most common reasons for adverse job actions,’ entitling the plaintiff who proves a prima facie 
case to a presumption that intentional discrimination has taken place.”  Deborah C. Malamud, 
The Last Minuet:  Disparate Treatment after Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2229, 2233 (1995).  For 
instance, “[i]n a termination case . . ., to establish a prima facie case the plaintiff need only 
show that:  (1) he is a member of a protected class . . .; (2)  he was working in a job for which 
he was qualified; (3)  his employment was terminated; and (4)  his position remained open or 
was subsequently filled by someone of similar qualifications.”  Krieger, supra note 79, at 
1177. 
81.  Tex. Depart. of Community Aff. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1981).  See also 
Malamud, supra note 80, at 2233. “In order to avoid a directed verdict, the employer must 
then meet a burden of production—as opposed to a burden of persuasion—by introducing 
evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision.” Id. 
82.  Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56.  See also Krieger, supra note 79, at 1178. “Under the 
McDonnell Douglas/Burdine model of disparate treatment proof, after a defendant articulates 
a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the contested employment decision, the plaintiff can 
prevail only by proving that the proffered reason was not the ‘true reason’ for the decision, but 
a ‘pretext for discrimination.’  In any cause adjudicated under the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine 
paradigm, the reason an employer offered to explain the negative action taken against a target 
employee must accordingly be classified as either the ‘true’ reason for its action or a ‘phony 
reason’—a ‘sham,’ ‘mask,’ ‘façade,’ or ‘cover-up’ for the ‘true’ discriminatory motive.  Given 
the rhetoric of McDonnell Douglas and its progeny, finding against an employer at the third 
stage of proof is, in essence, finding that the employer has lied to the plaintiff and the court.” 
Id. 
83.  “The most common method of proving pretext is to show that the employer’s 
proffered reason is not worthy of credence either because it appears implausible in light of 
data upon which such an employment decision should have been based, or because it appears 
inconsistent with decisions reached in similar cases involving employees outside of plaintiff’s 
protected class. . . .  More specifically . . . the conscious discriminatory purpose required to 
prevail in a disparate treatment case might be inferred from the following types of evidence:  
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For instance, in Jauregui v. City of Glendale,84 a Hispanic police officer 
who had been denied promotion seven times brought a lawsuit against the 
City of Glendale alleging that the City had discriminated against him on the 
basis of race or national origin in violation of Title VII.  The City defended 
on the ground that “Jauregui was never promoted because he possesses poor 
interpersonal relationship skills and strong interpersonal skills are essential 
for a police supervisor.”85  The district court held that “Jauregui had been 
discriminated against in violation of Title VII.”86  The City’s statement 
purporting to justify the failure to promote constitutes a misrepresentation, 
thus implicating the epistemology of ignorance.  That this is the case is 
clearly seen in the fact that, on review, the court of appeals found that the 
City’s asserted justification was a mere pretext and misdescription of reality 
because (1) the City had failed to include “specific examples of Officer 
Jauregui’s purported lack of interpersonal relationship skills . . . in his 
performance evaluations” and (2) a white male police officer “with lower 
scores on the objective examinations” was “promoted over Officer Jauregui” 
even though the white officer “had a lack of ‘interpersonal relationship skills’ 
recorded in his performance evaluations.”87  The court found that this 
“inconsistency in the City’s selective application of its asserted basis for 
denying promotion itself creates an inference of unlawful discrimination.”88 
Similarly, in Bennum v. Rutgers State University,89 Alfred Bennum, a 
Hispanic Associate Professor who was denied promotion to full professor, 
brought a Title VII lawsuit against Rutgers University alleging that he had 
been denied a promotion on the basis of race or national origin.  The District 
Court found that Bennun had established “a prima facie case of disparate 
treatment and that Rutgers’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason, failure to 
meet the university’s high standards for full professorship . . . was a pretext 
 
(1) Evidence that the objective data maintained by the defendant did not support the result 
reached by the decisionmaker; (2)  Evidence that the decisionmaker seemed to undervalue or 
ignore facts favorable to the employee; (3)  Evidence that the decisionmaker made a judgment 
about the plaintiff without being able to point to specific events which would reasonably 
support such a judgment; or (4)  Evidence showing that similarly situated [white] employees 
were on occasion treated more favorably.”  Krieger, supra note 79, at 1179-1180. 
84.  852 F.2d 1128 (1988). 
85.  Id. at 1131. 
86.  852 F.2d at 1131. 
87.  Id. at 1135. 
88.  Id.  See also Krieger, supra note 79, at 1181. “We know from our experience that 
more often than not people do not act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying 
reasons, especially in a business setting.  Thus, when all legitimate reasons for rejecting an 
applicant have been eliminated as possible reasons for the employer’s actions, it is more likely 
than not the employer, whom we generally assume acts only with some reason, based his 
decision on an impermissible consideration such as race.” Id. (quoting Furnco Construction 
Corp. v. Waters 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)). 
89.  941 F.2d 154 (1991). 
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for discriminatory denial of the promotion. . . .”90  The court of appeals found 
that Rutgers’s purported nondiscriminatory reason for failure to promote 
Bennun, “the poor quality and insufficient quantity of his research,” was a 
pretext because white professors were granted promotion under more lenient 
standards than were applied to Bennun.91  For instance, the University had 
found that a white professor’s publications were “above average in 
quantity . . . while Bennun’s publication rate was questionable,” even though 
Bennun had 18 more publications than the white professor.92  Again, this case 
shows how the dominant group misrepresents or misdescribes reality by 
providing pretextual reasons for their employment actions in a way that 
implicates the epistemology of ignorance.  Indeed, some scholars argue that 
the employment “law of pretext in general” is deeply problematic in that it 
“emboldens employers to lie about their true motivations and facilitates their 
avoidance of liability by relying on secrets and lies.”93 
Moreover, the epistemology of ignorance is protected and promoted by 
making summary judgment easier to obtain for employers—and thereby 
enabling them to win without a trial—in cases where pretextual reasons have 
been advanced to justify employment decisions taken against minority 
employee plaintiffs.  In such situations, the proof structure associated with 
the legal doctrine in this area—namely, the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine line 
of cases—to the extent that it “does shape decisionmaking [on summary 
judgment], its effects are often detrimental to [employee] plaintiffs . . . 
because McDonnall Douglas-Burdine renders courts less able to recognize 
forms of discrimination that do not straightforwardly match the proof 
structure’s template.”94 
 
90.  Id. at 158-59. 
91.  941 F.2d at 177, 178-180. 
92.  Id. at 179.  See also, Krieger, supra note 79, at 1181. “Pretext analysis thus rests on 
the assumption that, absent discriminatory animus, employment decisionmakers are rational 
actors.  They make evenhanded decisions using optimal inferential strategies in which all 
relevant behavioral events are identified and weighted to account for transient situational 
factors beyond the employee’s control  If an employer’s proffered explanation for its decision 
is shown to be irrational or implausible in light of the relevant data set, the trier of fact may 
conclude, and to find for the plaintiff, must conclude, that the reasons given did not really 
motivate the decisionmaker, but were simply contrived to mask discriminatory intent.” Id.; 
Malamud, supra note 80, at 2258 n.100. “The growing literature of the critical race theory 
movement is built upon, and stands witness to, the perception by legal scholars from ‘outsider’ 
groups that ‘racism is normal, not aberrant, in American society’ . . . a perception that would 
support the conclusion that ‘arbitrary’ decisions that are adverse to ‘outsiders’ are in fact 
discriminatory.” Id. (quoting Richard Delgado, Introduction in CRITICAL RACE THEORY:  THE 
CUTTING EDGE XIV (Richard Delgado Ed. 1995)). 
93.  Natasha T. Martin, Colloquium: Pretext in Peril, 75 MO. L. REV. 313, 329 (2010) 
(citing Catherine J. Lanctot, Secrets and Lies: The Need for a Definitive Rule of Law in Pretext 
Cases, 61 LA. L. REV. 539 (2001)). 
94.  Malamud, supra note 80, at 2279-2280. 
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Beyond all of this, perhaps the best way of proving such discriminatory 
discharge or treatment is by showing that similarly situated employees have 
been treated differently.95  However, where the employer lacks knowledge 
that similarly situated employees have been treated differently, such 
ignorance may constitute a defense to the allegation that discrimination has 
taken place.96  Thus, as predicted by the epistemology of ignorance, the 
ignorance of the employer enables the employer to engage in racial 
domination or discrimination and undermine the rights of minority 
employees. 
 
VI.      IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY IN THE TRUMP 
ERA AND THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF IGNORANCE 
 
In November 2016, Donald Trump was elected President of the United 
States.97  Some contend that Trump was elected President because he took a 
very strong position on immigration enforcement.98  Among other things, 
Trump strongly attacked immigrants from Mexico and promised to construct 
 
95.  See Martin, supra note 93, at 323. “To show pretext, the plaintiff presents evidence 
from which one can draw a discriminatory animus.  The method of presenting pretextual 
evidence varies widely, but the most common avenues include the use of comparative data 
involving similarly situated individuals, statistics reflecting the overall composition of the 
employer’s workforce, inconsistencies or contradictions in the employer’s explanation or 
other information surrounding the circumstances of the plaintiff’s employment that raise an 
inference of discrimination.” Id. 
96.  See Mechnig v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 864 F.2d 1359, 1366 (7th Cir. 1988). 
97.  Bill Ong Hing, Entering the Trump Ice Age: Contextualizing the New Immigration 
Enforcement Regime, 5 TEX. A&M L. REV. 253, 255 (2018). 
98.  Id. at 256.  See also Kristina M. Campbell, Dreamers Deferred: The Broken Promise 
of Immigration Reform in the Obama Years, 25 TEX. HISP. J.L. & POL’Y. 1, 4 n.15 (2018). 
“Since he assumed office in January 2017, there has arguably been no issue used more by 
President Trump than immigration in order to both unite his supporters and divide his 
opponents.” Id.; Gowri J. Krishna, Growing the Resistance: A Call to Action for Transactional 
Lawyers in the Era of Trump, 7 TENN. J. RACE GENDER & S. J. 206, 211 (2018). “Trump’s 
campaign rhetoric” spoke “of removing all undocumented immigrants from the U.S.” Id.; 
Jayashri Srikantiah & Shirin Sinnar, White Nationalism as Immigration Policy, 71 STAN. L. 
REV. ONLINE 197, 198 (2019). “[Trump] began his presidential campaign by denouncing 
Mexican migrants as ‘rapists’.” Id.; Kevin R. Johnson, The New Latinx “Repatriation”? 
Removals, Criminal Justice, and the Efforts to Remove Latinx Peoples from the United States, 
U. OF CAL. DAVIS LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER SERIES, March 18, 2019, at 22. “From day one of 
his campaign, [Trump] made aggressive immigration enforcement the cornerstone of his 
platform.” Id. 
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a “great, great wall99 along the southern border.”100  In addition, Trump called 
for “a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States.”101  
Shortly after Trump was sworn in as President of the United States, on 
January 27, 2017, Trump promulgated an Executive Order 13, 769 (EO-1) 
which sought to ban immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into the United 
States from seven primarily Muslim nations:  Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, 
Sudan, Syria and Yemen.102  The legality and constitutionality of the order 
was almost immediately challenged in the lower federal courts and in 
Washington v. Trump,103 the federal district court enjoined the enforcement 
of EO-1.104  Subsequently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s injunctive order.105  In the face of this judicial 
action, President Trump issued an amended Executive Order 3,780 (EO-2) 
on March 6, 2017, to replace the first EO-1.106  EO-2 again barred entry into 
the United States from predominantly Muslim countries but sought to correct 
some of the problems that the lower courts had found in EO-1.107  EO-2 was 
subsequently enjoined by federal district courts in Hawaii,108 and in 
Maryland.109  The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Ninth Circuits 
affirmed these injunctions.110  In response to these judicial decisions, 
President Trump on September 24, 2017, announced a Presidential 
proclamation (the Proclamation) restricting immigration from eight 
 
99.  Professor Hing explains the symbolism of the wall: “To the Author, the symbolism 
is significant.  Its message of exclusion is clear.  Latinos—primarily Mexicans—are not 
wanted.  But the message of exclusion reaches communities on both sides of the border—
Latinos are not wanted on either side of the border.  This is a message not simply intended for 
undocumented immigrants. The Wall’s message is one of de-legitimizing Latinos already in 
the United States.”  Hing, supra note 97, at 319-320. 
100.  Hing, supra note 97, at 256-57.  See also Donald Trump Speech, Debates and 
Campaign Quotes, NEWSDAY, Nov. 10, 2016. With respect to Mexican immigrants, Trump 
observed: “When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best.  They’re sending 
people who have lots of problems, and they’re bringing problems with us.  They’re bringing 
drugs.  They’re bringing crime.  They’re rapists.  And, some, I assume, are good people.” Id.  
101.  Earl M. Maltz, The Constitution and the Trump Travel Ban, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 391, 392 (2018).  See also Shalin Bhargava Ray, Plenary Power and Animus in 
Immigration Law, 80 OHIO ST. L.J. 13, 21-22 (2019). “Critics note that President Trump has a 
long history of expressing animus towards people of color and Muslims during his campaign 
and after taking the oath of office.” Id. 
102.  Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Feb. 1, 2017). 
103.  No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017). 
104.  Wash. v. Trump, supra note 103, at *1. 
105.  Wash. v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017). 
106.  Exec. Order No. 13,780 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 9, 2017). 
107.  Id. §2(c), 82 Fed. Reg. at 13213. 
108.  Haw. v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227 (D. Haw. 2017). 
109.  Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 539 (D. Md. 2017). 
110.  Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017); Haw. v. 
Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017). 
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countries.111  Again, the Proclamation was enjoined by district courts in 
Maryland and Hawaii.112  The Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Ninth 
Circuits affirmed the issuance of the injunctions, with the Fourth Circuit 
holding that the Proclamation violated the Establishment Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution and the Ninth Circuit finding the Proclamation violated the 
Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA).113  On appeal in the U.S. Supreme 
Court, the Court upheld in a 5-4 decision the validity of the travel ban 
announced in the Proclamation.114  Writing for the Court, Chief Justice 
Roberts concluded that the Proclamation did not violate either the INA or the 
Establishment clause.115  The U.S. Supreme Court decision in the Muslim 
travel ban case implicates the epistemology of ignorance. 
As to the epistemology of ignorance “a lack of knowledge . . . often is 
actively [or consciously] produced” or unconsciously produced in order to 
subordinate or oppress people.116  This phenomenon has occurred in the 
Muslim travel ban case in a very striking way.  In the Travel ban case, the 
Supreme Court has, in essence, produced ignorance which has enabled the 
government to engage in discrimination and subordinate ethnic or religious 
minorities.  As Justice Sotomayor observed in her dissent in the Muslim 
travel ban case, the Supreme Court failed to uphold the First Amendment 
guarantee by leaving “undisturbed a policy first advertised openly and 
unequivocally as a ‘total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the 
United States behind a façade of national security concerns.’”117  In so doing, 
the court actively produced a lack of knowledge of the President’s true 
primary motives in enacting the Proclamation or executive order banning 
travel to the United States.  The court, in essence, ignored a series of 
Presidential statements which demonstrated the intent to discriminate against 
Muslims.  Justice Sotomayor sets out the following to demonstrate that “the 
Proclamation was motivated by hostility and animus to the Muslim faith”118: 
 
 
111.  Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161, 45165-67 (Sept. 24, 2017). 
112.  Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 570 (D. Md. 2017); 
Haw. v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140 (D. Haw. 2017).  “[The Proclamation] was challenged 
in federal court.  Plaintiffs were Hawaii, the Muslim Association of Hawaii, and three 
individuals.  Plaintiffs claimed that [the Proclamation] prevented their affiliates from entering 
the United States in violation of, among other things, the [Immigration and Nationality Act] 
and the Establishment Clause.”  Comment, First Amendment—Establishment Clause—
Judicial Review or Pretext—Trump v. Hawaii, 132 HARV. L. REV. 327, 328 (2018). 
113.  Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 2018); Haw. v. 
Trump, 878 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2017). 
114.  Trump v. Haw., 138 S.Ct. 2392 (2018). 
115.  Trump v. Haw., 138 S.Ct. at 2415, 2423. 
116.  See Sullivan & Tuana, supra note 4, at 1-2. 
117.  Trump v. Haw., 138 S.Ct. at 2433. 
118.  Id. at 2435. 
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(1) “[O]n December 7, 2015 [Trump] issued a formal ‘statement’ 
calling for a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering 
the United States”119 
(2) “In January 2016, during a Republican primary debate,” Trump 
stated that he did not want “to ‘rethink [his] position on banning 
Muslims from entering the country.’”120 
(3) “In March 2016, he expressed his belief that ‘Islam hates us . . . 
[W]e can’t allow people coming into the country who have this 
hatred of the United States [a]nd of people who are not 
Muslim.’”121 
(4) In March 2016, “Trump called for surveillance of mosques in 
the United States, blaming terrorist attacks on Muslim’s lack of 
‘assimilation’ and their commitment to ‘sharia law.’”122 
(5) That same month, he stated that “Muslims ‘do not respect us at 
all.’”123 
(6) In June 2016, he used somewhat different language and 
characterized his “proposal as a suspension of immigration 
from countries where there’s a proven history of terrorism” but 
he stated that in so doing he was not “‘pulling back from’ his 
pledged Muslim ban.”124 
(7) “On January 27, 2017 . . . Trump signed EO-1 entitled 
“Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry in the 
United States.”125  The next day one of Trump’s advisers 
indicated EO-1 was a legal version of the Muslim ban.126  On 
February 3, 2017, a federal district court in Washington 
enjoined the enforcement of EO-1.127  The United States 
declined to continue defending EO-1 and stated that the 
President would issue a new executive order in place of EO-
1.128 
(8) “On March 6, 2017, President Trump issued [EO-2].”129  One 
of Trump’s advisers stated that “the EO-2 would ‘have the same 
 
119.  Id. 
120.  Trump v. Haw., 138 S.Ct. at 2435-36. 
121.  Id. 
122.  Id. 
123.  Id. 
124.  Id. 
125.  Id. 
126.  Id. 
127.  Id. 
128.  Trump v. Haw., 138 S.Ct. at 2437. 
129.  Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (EO-2). 
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basic policy outcome’ as EO-1.”130  U.S. district courts in 
Hawaii and Baltimore enjoined EO-2 and its travel bans before 
it could take effect.  The Fourth and Ninth Circuit affirmed 
those orders.131  In June 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court granted 
certiorari and allowed certain aspects of the EO-2 to go into 
effect pending appeal.132 
(9) While lawsuits were pending, Trump made additional 
assertions suggesting that Muslims should be excluded from the 
U.S.A.133  For instance, Trump said “that EO-2 was just a 
‘watered down version of the first one.’”134  He also asserted 
“that it was ‘very hard’ for Muslims to assimilate into Western 
culture.”135  In September 2017, “Trump issued the 
Proclamation which restricts entry of certain nationals from six 
Muslim-majority countries.”136  In November 2017, Trump 
retweeted three anti-Muslim videos.137  The White House 
Deputy Press Secretary explained the videos by relating them 
to the Proclamation observing “that the ‘President has been 
talking about these security issues for years now, from the 
campaign trail to the White House’ and ‘has addressed those 
issues with the travel order that he issued earlier this year and 
the companion Proclamation.’”138 
 
Given all of this, Justice Sotomayor states that “a reasonable observer 
would conclude that the Proclamation was driven primarily by anti-Muslim 
animus rather than by the Government’s asserted national security 
justifications.”139 
Despite this, the majority actively produces ignorance as to the main 
reason for the issuance of the Proclamation which results in the subordination 
of Muslims—a religious or ethnic minority.  The Court observed that the 
issue is “not whether to denounce the statements” but rather the “significance 
 
130.  Trump v. Haw., 138 S.Ct. at 2437. 
131.  Id. 
132.  Id. 
133.  Id. 
134.  Id. 
135.  Id. 
136.  Id. at 2438. 
137.  Id. 
138.  Trump v. Haw., 138 S.Ct. at 2438. 
139.  Id.  See also Comment, First Amendment—Establishment Clause, supra note 112, 
at 334. “On one view, some of the President’s statements were ‘smoking gun’ evidence that 
[the Proclamation] arose from a desire to target foreign nationals on the basis of religion.  ‘I 
think Islam hates us,’ he had said, ‘and we can’t allow people coming into this country who 
have this hatred of the United States.’” Id. 
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of those statements in reviewing a Presidential directive, neutral on its face, 
addressing a matter within the core of executive responsibility.”140  The Court 
observed that “[f]or more than a century, this court has recognized that the 
admission and exclusion of foreign nationals is a fundamental sovereign 
attribute exercised by the government’s political departments largely immune 
from judicial control.”141  The Court then said that when the executive 
excludes a foreign national from entering “on the basis of a facially legitimate 
and bona fide reason, the courts will neither look behind the exercise of that 
discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against the asserted 
constitutional interests of U.S. citizens.”142  The Court further explained that 
this “deferential standard of review” has been applied “across different 
contexts and constitutional claims” and “‘has particular force’ in admission 
and immigration cases that overlap with ‘the area of national security.’”143  
Although the Court said that an application of this deferential Mandel 
standard would ask “only whether the policy is facially legitimate and bona 
fide,” it nevertheless stated that “for our purposes today, we assume that we 
may look behind the face of the Proclamation to the extent of applying 
rational basis review.”144  This standard of review asks “whether the entry 
policy is plausibly related to the Government’s stated objective to protect the 
country and improve vetting processes.”145As a result, the Court said that it 
“may consider plaintiffs’ extrinsic evidence, but will uphold the policy as 
long as it can reasonably be understood to result from a justification 
independent of unconstitutional grounds.”146  Given this, the Court then 
observed that it “hardly ever strikes down a policy as illegitimate under 
rational basis scrutiny.”147  And the Court stated that it had struck down 
policy under the rational basis standard only when “the laws at issue lack any 
purpose other than a ‘bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular 
group.’”148  The Court then held that this Proclamation is related to legitimate 
state interests and that it cannot be said that the Proclamation is “‘inexplicable 
by anything but animus.’”149  The Court held that “there is persuasive 
evidence that the entry suspension has a legitimate grounding in national 
security concerns.”150  For example, the Court pointed out (1) that “the 
 
140.  Trump v. Haw., 138 S.Ct. at 2418. 
141.  Id. 
142.  Id. at 2419. 
143.  Trump v. Haw., 138 S.Ct. at 2419.  
144.  Id. at 2420. 
145.  Id. 
146.  Id. 
147.  Id. 
148.  Id. 
149.  Id. at 2420-21. 
150.  Id. at 2421. 
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Proclamation is expressly premised on legitimate purposes:  preventing entry 
of nationals who cannot be adequately vetted and inducing other nations to 
improve their practices,” (2) that “the text says nothing about religion,” (3) 
that the “policy covers just 8% of the world’s Muslim population,” (4) that 
the policy “reflects the results of a worldwide review process undertaken by 
multiple Cabinet officials and their agencies,” (5) that “since the President 
introduced entry restrictions . . . three Muslim-majority countries . . . have 
been removed from the list of covered countries” and that the Proclamation 
states that the restrictions “will remain in force only so long as necessary to 
‘address the identified inadequacies and risks,’” (6) “the Proclamation 
includes significant exceptions for various categories of foreign nationals,” 
and (7) “the Proclamation creates a waiver program open to all covered 
foreign nationals seeking entry as immigrants or non-immigrants.”151  The 
Court held that “[u]nder these circumstances, the Government has set forth a 
sufficient national security justification to survive rational basis review.”152 
In so doing, the Court, in essence, ignored the strong evidence that the 
Proclamation was primarily the result of prejudice against Muslims.  The use 
of the rational based scrutiny allows the Court to, in essence, set aside the 
discriminatory statements against Muslims.  As Justice Sotomayor pointed 
out in her dissent, the majority “utterly failed to address in it legal analysis” 
the President’s statements which “strongly support the conclusions that the 
Proclamation was issued to express hostility toward Muslims and exclude 
them from the country.”153  As a result, Justice Sotomayor concluded that “it 
simply cannot be said that the Proclamation has a legitimate basis.”154  The 
majority of the Court has therefore actively constructed an ignorance as to 
the primary reason for the issuance of the Proclamation.  As Justice 
Sotomayor explained, the Court has accepted the government’s invitation to 
set aside “the President’s problematic statements” and “defer to the President 
on immigration and national security.”155  Indeed, Sotomayor said that the 
majority sees “the President’s charged statements about Muslims as 
irrelevant.”156 
Another striking way in which the majority constructed ignorance as to 
whether the Proclamation was motivated by bias against Muslims as opposed 
 
151.  Trump v. Haw., 138 S.Ct. at 2421. 
152.  Id. at 2423. 
153.  Id. at 2442. 
154.  Id. 
155.  Trump v. Haw., 138 S.Ct. at 2440. 
156.  Id. at 2447.  See also Comment, First Amendment—Establishment Clause, supra 
note 112, at 334. “The travel ban decision thus suggests that even the strongest evidence of 
discriminatory motive will not trigger heightened scrutiny, so long as that evidence is extrinsic 
to the face of the law under challenge.  So even when challengers to a law like [the 
Proclamation] can persuade a court to ‘look behind’ that law, doing so may be futile.” Id. 
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to national security is found in the fact that the government refused to make 
the administrative process reports on which the Proclamation was 
purportedly based available to the public.157  Obviously, it would be difficult 
to make an informed decision as opposed to a decision based on ignorance 
that the Proclamation was based on legitimate national security reasons when 
the supporting documents and reports are not publicly available. 
Interestingly, some commentators were hopeful that in the Travel Ban 
case Justice Kennedy might be “perhaps most primed for edification 
regarding the newly manifest points of perfunctory judicial review in 
exclusion cases.”158  They thought that Justice Kennedy’s “reputation as 
defender of Constitutional liberty” might lead Kennedy to find, in light of 
“Trump’s extensive record of anti-Muslim statements,” that Trump’s facially 
neutral “national security interest was provided in bad faith, as a pretext for 
its [anti]Muslim] purpose.”159  However, this hope proved to be in vain.  
Justice Kennedy joined “the Court’s opinion [in Trump v. Hawaii] in 
whole.”160  Justice Kennedy expressed only a seemingly empty admonition 
that: 
 
[T]here are numerous instances in which the statements and 
actions of government officials are not subject to judicial scrutiny 
or intervention.  That does not mean those officials are free to 
disregard the Constitution and the rights it proclaims and protects.  
The oath that all officials take to adhere to the Constitution is not 
confined to those spheres in which the judiciary can correct or 
even comment upon what those officials say or do.  Indeed, the 
very fact that an official may have broad discretion, discretion free 
from judicial scrutiny, makes it all the more imperative for him or 
her to adhere to the Constitution and to its meaning and 
promise.161 
 
157.  Id. at 2443 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump 
(IRAP II), 883 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 2018)) (“[T]he government chose not to make the review 
publicly available” even in redacted form.). 
158.  Matthew J. Lindsay, The Perpetual “Invasion”: Past as Prologue in Constitutional 
Immigration Law, 23 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 369, 385 (2018). 
159.  Id. at 390. 
160.  Trump v. Haw., 138 S.Ct. at 2423 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
161.  Id. at 2424; see also Frank Colucci, When Structure Fails: Justice Kennedy, Liberty 
and Trump v. Hawaii, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 1141, 1142 (2019) (“Justice Anthony M. Kennedy’s 
final concurrence in Trump v. Hawaii shaped both initial reactions to his retirement from the 
U.S. Supreme Court and first assessments of his legacy.  Commentators called his vote to join 
the Trump majority, which allowed President Trump’s order banning entry by nationals of 
several countries to take effect, a ‘betrayal,’ a ‘surrender,’ and a ‘coup.’  Others categorized 
Kennedy’s last opinion as ‘depressing defeatism,’ ‘at odds’ with the ‘animating principles’ of 
his larger approach to law.  Still others read it as an ‘empty gesture’ and ‘an expression of 
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Beyond the Travel Ban case, the Trump administration has practiced the 
epistemology of ignorance—misrepresentation and misinterpretation—in 
regard to other immigration issues.  Perhaps the central focus of Trump’s 
presidential campaign was on immigration issues.162  He particularly 
encouraged a crackdown on immigrants of color.163  Indeed, one 
commentator has argued that Trump’s immigration enforcement initiatives, 
which largely target Latinos, constitute “a concerted effort to remove 
[Latino] people, including large numbers of Mexicans and Central Americans 
from the United States.”164  In so doing, he made misrepresentations, 
implicating the epistemology of ignorance, to justify immigration 
enforcement efforts against Latinos and others and thereby helped advance 
the oppression and exclusion of immigrants of color.  As a result, Trump 
helped preserve the socially dominant position of white Americans.  First, 
Trump argues that President Obama had failed to enforce the immigration 
laws.165  This was a misrepresentation of fact.  In reality, President Obama 
deported extremely large numbers of undocumented immigrants on the order 
of about 400,000 persons per year.166  Trump used this alleged lack of 
enforcement of immigration laws to justify the implementation of draconian 
 
defeat and a loss’”). 
162.  Lindsay, supra note 158, at 369 (“Donald Trump ascended to the presidency largely 
on the promise to protect the American people—their physical and financial security, their 
culture and language, even the integrity of their electoral system against an invading foreign 
menace”). 
163.  Id. (During the campaign, Trump argued that “[o]nly extraordinary defensive 
measures, including ‘extreme vetting’ of would be immigrants, a ban on Muslims entering the 
United States, and a 2,000-mile-long wall along the nation’s southern border could repel the 
encroaching hordes”). 
164.  Johnson, supra note 98, at 4 
165.  President Donald Trump, Immigration Speech (Sept. 1, 2016). 
166.  Brian Bennett, U.S. Reported Record Numbers of Immigrants, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 6, 
2010), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2010-oct-06-la-na-illegal-immigration-201 
01007-story.html; see also Campbell, supra note 98, at 14 (“Deportations increased during the 
first four years of Obama’s presidency with a high of 400,000 noncitizens being removed from 
the United States in 2012.  The total number of persons removed by the Obama Administration 
exceeded the total number of persons removed in the prior 100 years.  While Obama and 
members of his administration argued that they were merely enforcing the law as dictated by 
Congress, the fact remains that the manner in which the DHS aggressively enforced the 
removal of noncitizens is unparalleled.  The Agency’s myopic focus on removing ‘criminal 
aliens’ from the United States has resulted in the inequitable and unjust enforcement of 
immigration law, causing the removal of thousands of long-term legal permanent residents of 
the United States . . . and other legal noncitizens convicted of misdemeanors and other non-
serious crimes”); Serena Marshall, Obama Has Deported More People Than Any Other 
President, ABC NEWS (Aug. 29, 2016), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/obamas-deportation-
policy-numbers/story?id=41715661 (“Between 2009 and 2015, [Barack Obama’s] 
administration has removed more than 2.5 million people through immigration orders, which 
doesn’t include the number of people who ‘self-deported’ or were turned away and/or returned 
to their home country at the  border by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP).”). 
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immigration laws and policies directed especially at Latinos and Muslims. 
Beyond this, President Trump issued two additional executive orders 
which were aimed at immigration enforcement on the border and in the 
interior of the nation.167  The Trump administration attempted to justify these 
orders and their expanded enforcement of the immigration laws against 
undocumented immigrants on the grounds that immigrants constitute a crime 
problem.  For instance the Interior E.O. provides: 
 
Tens of thousands of removable aliens have been released into 
communities across the country, solely because their home 
countries refuse to accept their repatriation.  Many of these aliens 
are criminals who have served time in our federal, state and local 
jails.  The presence of such individuals in the United States, and 
the practices of foreign nations that refuse the repatriation of their 
nationals, are contrary to the national interest.168 
 
Likewise, the Border E.O. provides: 
 
[T]ransnational criminal organizations operate sophisticated drug 
and human trafficking networks and smuggling operations on both 
sides of the southern border, contributing to a significant increase 
in violent crime and United States deaths from dangerous drugs.  
Among those who illegally enter are those who seek to harass 
Americans through acts of terror or criminal conduct.  Continued 
illegal immigration presents a clear and present danger to the 
interests of the United States.169 
 
These claims regarding the criminal threat allegedly posed by 
undocumented immigrants constitute misrepresentations and, therefore, 
implicate the epistemology of ignorance.  In fact, scholars have long pointed 
out that “immigrants are less likely to commit serious crimes or be behind 
bars than the native born, and high rates of immigration are associated with 
lower rates of violent crime and property crime.”170 
 
167.  See Exec. Order No. 13767 of Jan. 25, 2017, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017) 
[hereinafter Border E.O.]; Exec. Order No. 13768 of Jan. 25, 2017 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 
25, 2017) (hereinafter Interior E.O.). 
168.  Interior E.O., supra note 167, at § 1; Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Civil 
Rights in the Trump Administration: Law and Policy Making by Executive Order, 57 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 611, 633 (2017). 
169.  Border E.O., supra note 167, at § 1; Johnson, supra note 168, Immigration and 
Civil Rights in the Trump Administration, at 633. 
170.  Walter Ewing et. al., The Criminalization of Immigration in the United States, AM. 
IMMIGR. COUNS. (July 13, 2015), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/ 
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In addition, we see another example of the epistemology of ignorance 
at work in the area of immigration in the Trump administration in the 
controversy involving the separation of children from undocumented parents 
at the border.  In April 2018, the Trump administration stated that it would 
enact a so-called “zero tolerance” immigration policy by which they would  
bring a criminal prosecution against all adults who illegally enter into the 
United States.171  If these detained and criminally charged adults had children 
with them, the children were separated from them because the children are 
not criminally charged and could not be placed in jail.172  The government 
separated about 2,500 children from their parents as a result of this zero 
tolerance policy.173  The United States Department of Health and Human 
Services Office of Refugee Resettlement took custody of these children.174  
Once word reached the general public about the separation of children from 
their parents, many were outraged.175  Former First Ladies expressed their 
 
criminalization-immigration-united-states; see also Philip L. Torrey, Alternative Facts in the 
War on Immigrants, HARV. L. & POL’Y. REV. (2017), https://harvardlpr.com/2017/03/03/ 
alternative-facts-in-the-war-on-immigrants; (“Here’s the truth on immigrants and crime.  
Numerous studies have shown that the crime rate among immigrants is significantly lower 
than among native-born U.S. Citizens.  In the 1990s and 2000s, as the immigrant population 
dramatically grew in the United States, FBI data shows that the violent crime rate 
simultaneously plummeted.  These and other statistics demons6trate that the vast majority of 
immigrants are law-abiding, contributing members of society”); Hing, supra note 97, at 273 
(“However time and again studies demonstrate that immigrants are less crime prone than 
natives or have no effect on crime rates.  Relatedly, macro level analysis show that ‘increased 
immigration does not increase crime and sometimes even causes crime rates to fall’”). 
171.  See Marilyn Haigh, What’s Happening at the Border?  Here’s What We Know 
about Immigrant Children and Family Separations, TEX. TRIBUNE (June 18, 2018), https:// 
www.texastribune.org/2018/06/18/separated-immigrant-children-families-border-mexico; 
see also Fatma E. Marouf, Executive Overreaching in Immigration Adjudication, 93 TUL. L. 
REV. 707, 769-70 (2019) (Attorney General Sessions stated that under this “zero tolerance 
policy” that “‘If you cross the Southwest border unlawfully, then we will prosecute you.  It’s 
that simple.’ . . . [and] that his goal was to prosecute ‘100 percent’ of people who entered 
without authorization.”). 
172.  See Haigh, What’s Happening at the Border, supra note 171.  See also Marouf, 
Executive Overreaching, supra note 171, at 772 (“[A]fter the Trump administration instituted 
a ‘zero tolerance policy, a new much more visible phase of family separation began.  DHS 
began separating children from their parents when they were apprehended together at the 
border.”). 
173.  See Haigh, supra note 171. 
174.  Id. (“They were sent to over a hundred different facilities for children all across the 
United States.  The vast majority of these children came from Guatamala (56%) and Honduras 
(33%).”); Marouf, supra note 171, at 772. 
175.  Id.; see also Marouf, supra note 171, at 772 (“Between April and June 2018, the 
separation of children erupted into a nationwide scandal”); Mari J. Matsuda, This Is (Not) Who 
We Are: Korematsu,. Constitutional Interpretation, and National Identity, 128 YALE L.J. 
FORUM (2019) (“Bear Witness:  we saw children torn from their parents at the border, babies 
incarcerated, toddlers appearing alone at legal hearings, children held in cages, children dying 
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strong opposition to this policy.176  In denying a motion to dismiss a lawsuit 
challenging the separation of children from their parents, a federal judge 
stated that the allegations regarding child separation “describe government 
conduct that arbitrarily tears at the sacred bond between parent and child” 
and said that the conduct “is brutal, offensive, and fails to comport with 
traditional notions of fair play and decency.”177  As a result of this 
controversy, the Administration began to engage in misstatements and 
misrepresentations about this child separation policy in ways that implicate 
the epistemology of ignorance.  The administration made numerous 
misstatements regarding the separation of children.  First, the president and 
administration officials stated that the law or judicial decisions required the 
separation of the children.178  For instance, on June 15, 2018, Trump said, “I 
hate the children being taken away.  The Democrats have to change their law.  
That’s their law.”179  On June 7, 2018, Attorney General Jeff Sessions blamed 
a court decision for the child separation policy:  “Because of the Flores 
consent decree and a 9th Circuit decision, ICE can only keep families detained 
together for a very short period of time.”180  Similarly, White House Press 
Secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders stated on June 14, 2018, regarding the 
 
in custody; psychotropic drugs and sexual abuse handed out to children at private prisons we 
paid for.  We witnessed and many said as loudly as they could: ‘This is not who we are.’ Even 
an administration that first argued for the deterrent value of child separation retreated when 
outrage came from within the Republican Party”); Wendy Jennings, Separating Families 
Without Due Process:Hidden Child Removals Closer to Home, 22 CUNY L. REV. 1, 3-4 (2019) 
(“In the summer of 2018, a united and forceful public outcry mounted in response to the United 
States government’s family separation policy at the U.S.-Mexico border.  Americans across 
the political spectrum protested as pictures, videos and audio recordings of children being 
forcibly separated from their parents were circulated nationwide.  The mainstream media, in 
its coverage of the disaster, reported on the devastating consequences of removing children 
from their parents.  Medical groups were outraged about the impact on children, describing 
the separations as child abuse.  Due process and judicial oversight for the separated families 
seemed to be non-existent”). 
176.  See Matt Stevens & Sarah Mervosh, The Four Former First Ladies Condemn 
Trump’s Border Policy, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2018) https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/19/us/ 
politics/first-ladies-trump-family-separation.html (“Now, in the span of about 24 hours, all 
four living former first ladies have added their voices to the chorus of public critique, calling 
the practice [of separating children from their parents at the border] ‘immoral,’ ‘disgraceful’ 
and a ‘humanitarian crisis’”). 
177.  Erik Larson, Judge Calls Trump’s Border Separations of Children ‘Brutal’, 
BLOOMBERG (June 6, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-07/aclu-suit-
over-child-separations-at-border-may-proceed-judge. 
178.  Salvador Rizzo, The Facts about Trump’s Policy of Separating Families at the 
Border, WASH. POST (June 19, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/ 
wp/2018/06/19/the-facts-about-trumps-policy-of-separating-families-at-the-border. 
179.  Id. 
180.  Id. 
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child separation, “It’s the law and that’s what the law states.”181  On June 17, 
2018, Homeland Security Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen went so far as to state 
that “We do not have a policy of separating families at the border.  Period.”182  
These statements were all untrue.183  They therefore constitute misstatements 
and misrepresentations about the child separation policy as would be 
predicted by the epistemology of ignorance.  Contrary to these assertions by 
Trump and his employees, “immigrant families are being separated primarily 
because the Trump administration in April began to prosecute as many border 
offenses as possible as part of the zero tolerance policy.”184  As a result, “the 
Trump administration implemented this policy by choice and could end it by 
choice.  No law or court ruling mandates family separations.”185 
Under these circumstances, these misrepresentations regarding family 
separation helped enable the subordination and exclusion of immigrants of 
color, and, thereby, helped enable whites to maintain their socially dominant 
position in American society.  In this regard, family separation “is a 
government tool of oppression that has a deeply rooted history in the United 
States, tracing back to the colonization of indigenous peoples and chattel 
slavery.”186  As one commentator has explained, “Trump’s family separation 
policy echoes the process of indigenous elimination in which indigenous 
children were forcibly separated from their families and sent to government 
funded residential schools,” and “the forced separation of families that was 
part of the African slave trade.”187 
 
181. Id. 
182.  Id. 
183.  Id.; see also Marouf, supra note 171, at 772-73 (“President Trump and DHS 
Secretary Nielsen initially denied having a policy of separating children, but the 
administration’s internal documents contradicted that assertion”). 
184.  Rizzo, supra note 178. 
185.  Id.; see also Marouf, supra note 171, at 73 (“Once Trump realized the unpopularity 
of the family separation policy, he blamed Democrats for it, claiming that their ‘bad 
legislation’ was the problem and that he had no choice in the matter.  However, no law required 
children to be separated at the border”); see also Rose Cuison Villazor & Kevin R. Johnson, 
The Trump Administration and the War on Immigration Diversity, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
575, 611-12 (2019) (“No previous administration resorted to the separation of families as a 
device to deter migration from Central America.  The Trump Administration at least for a time 
pursued such a policy even though it had other policy options at its disposal.  The 
administration, for example, could have continued the policy of allowing bond hearings for 
migrant families and releasing them if they were not a flight risk or a danger to the community.  
Children thus could have been bonded out with their families so that families could have 
remained intact”); see also Adela C. Licona & Eithne Luibheid, The Regime of Destruction:  
Separating Families and Caging Children, 30 FEMINIST FORMATIONS, Issue 3, 45, 51 (2018) 
(“President Trump repeatedly claimed that he ‘hated’ to separate families, but was required to 
do so because of ‘bad laws’ passed by Democrats. In fact, there is no law requiring families 
crossing the border to be separated”). 
186.  Jennings, supra note 175, at 4. 
187.  Monika Batra Kashyap, Unsettling Immigration Laws:  Settler, Colonialism and 
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In this connection, child separation in the context of immigration is an 
issue that has been hidden and implicates the epistemology of ignorance in 
other important ways.  Perhaps surprisingly, states have begun “removing 
children from undocumented immigrant parents and terminating their 
parental rights.”188  Normally, the settled law has been that “courts may not 
terminate the rights of fit parents.”189  However, in the immigration context, 
there has been a “largely unnoticed, change in the law.”190  With respect to 
undocumented immigrants, fitness does not constitute a barrier to the 
deprivation and elimination of the rights of the parents to the child.191  To the 
contrary, “when courts and agencies believe that termination is in a child’s 
best interests, they will find that a parent’s undocumented status alone is 
sufficient to demonstrate unfitness.”192  Usually, three general sorts of 
reasons are given to establish that termination of the undocumented 
immigrant’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest:  (a) “it is not in the 
child’s best interest to live in a foreign country”; (2) “life in the United States 
provides more opportunities”; and (3) “many of these children have the 
opportunity to be adopted by American families.”193  Thus, the states have 
been empowered to “permanently deprive” undocumented immigrant parents 
of their children “separating them indefinitely with little hope of being 
reunited.”194 
This brutal trend of terminating the parental rights of undocumented 
immigrants implicates the epistemology of ignorance as it surely 
 
the U.S. Immigration Legal System, 46 URB. L.J. 548, 567-68 (2019); see also Licona & 
Luibheid, supra note 185, at 45-46 (“The Trump family separation policy builds on a long and 
brutal history of separating children from their families and communities.  The U.S. 
Government has consistently valued and supported white, middle-class, married families as a 
means to build the nation.  Families that are indigenous, of color, poor, queer, and non-
normative gender have been treated as threats to fear and expel or labor to exploit.  The forced 
separation of migrant families at the border fits into the United States long history of treating 
enslaved families as property whose members can be sold away from one another, forcing 
Native American children into boarding schools designed to violently strip away their 
language, culture, identity, family and community ties, immigration policies designed to 
prevent immigrants of color from settling and forming families; punitive, deeply inadequate 
social welfare policies, and domestic policies that punish, impoverish, incarcerate, and destroy 
poor, queer, indigenous, and racialized U.S. citizen families in part by cultivating a cradle-to-
prison pipeline that makes the United States the most incarcerated nation in the world”). 
188.  Marcia Yablon-Zug, Separation, Deportation, Termination, 32 B.C. J. LAW & SOC. 
JUST. 1, 4 (2012). 
189.  Id. 
190.  Id. 
191.  Id. at 4-5. 
192. Id. 
193.  Id. 
194.  Sarah Rogerson, Unintended and Unavoidable:  The Failure to Protect Rule and 
Its Consequences for Undocumented Parents and Their Children, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 580, 581 
(2012). 
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misrepresents and misdescribes what is in the best interests of the child.  
“Although these actions are purportedly taken in the best interests of the 
children, empirical research shows that children suffer emotional and 
psychological harm when they are separated from their parents or placed into 
foster care after their parents are detained.”195  As Yoshikawa and Suarez-
Orozco have explained: 
 
Research by the Urban Institute and others reveals the deep and 
irreversible harm that parental deportation causes in the lives of 
their children.  Having a parent ripped away permanently, without 
warning, is one of the most devastating and traumatic experiences 
in human development. . . .  In the long run, the children of 
deportation faced increased odds of lasting economic turmoil, 
psychic scarring, reduced school attainment, greater difficulty in 
maintaining relationships, social exclusion and lower earnings.196 
 
Moreover, in a recent review of the literature examining “the impact of 
deportation-related family separations on psychosocial well-being of 
children among the Latin[o] population” the authors found: 
 
That the accumulation of psychosocial stressors due to 
deportation-related family separation produced significant effects 
on children’s mental health and well-being.  Youth experienced a 
range of negative mental health outcomes including:  depression, 
anxiety and trauma.197 
 
VII.      FEDERALISM IN RECENT SUPREME COURT CASES 
AND THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF IGNORANCE 
 
The notion of “constitutional federalism” involves the idea “of judicial 
enforcement of structural limits on federal power, usually for the purpose of 
leaving greater scope for state and local authority.”198  In the era of Chief 
 
195.  Id. at 582. 
196.  Hirokazu Yoshikawa & Carola Suarez-Orozco, Opinion, Deporting Parents Hurts 
Kids, N.Y. TIMES (April 20, 2017); see also Rogerson, supra note 194. 
197.  Kristina Lovato, Corina Lopez, Leyla Karimli & Laura Abrams, The Impact of 
Deportation Related Family Separations on the Well-being of Latinx Children and Youth:  A 
Review of the Literature, 95 CHILDREN & YOUTH SERVS. REV., 109, 114 (2018). 
198.  Illya Somin, Federalism and the Roberts Court, 46 PUBLIUS:  THE JOURNAL OF 
FEDERALISM, 441, 442 (2016); see also Martin H. Redish, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS 
IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 344 (1990) (“The interests of ‘federalism,’ on the 
other hand, ‘represent . . . a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of 
both State and National Governments,’ where the federal government attempts to protect 
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Justice John Roberts,199 the idea of federalism has become extremely 
important.200  The Roberts Court has recently handed down some major cases 
in the area of federalism which illustrate the epistemology of ignorance at 
work in the area of race and law.  As federal judge Lynn Adelman has 
recognized, “[f]or African-Americans, particularly those living in the states 
of the former confederacy, the impact of the federalist doctrine has been 
devastating. . . .”201 
For instance, in NFIB v. Sebelius,202 the Supreme Court considered the 
constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
sometimes also known as “Obamacare.”  In Sebelius, the Supreme Court 
upheld the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate to buy health insurance 
as a tax.203  The Court, however, went on to hold that the Affordable Care 
Act’s expansion of Medicaid204 which required the states to cover “a new 
category of beneficiaries was unconstitutionally coercive because” the 
federal government “could theoretically withdraw all . . . of federal Medicaid 
funding” if the state failed to cover the new beneficiaries, namely, persons 
with incomes of up to 138 percent above the poverty level.205 
 
federal rights ‘in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the 
States’”) (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971)); see also Charlton C. Copeland, 
Beyond Separation in Federalism Enforcement: Medicaid Expansion, Coercion, and the Norm 
of Engagement, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 91, 106 (2012) (“Federalism, understood as the 
separation of substantive authority of the state and national government, provides the recipe 
for the protection of state authority as a constitutional commitment”). 
199.  See Benjamin Pomerance, The Center of Order: Chief Justice John Roberts and the 
Coming Struggle for a Respected Supreme Court, 82 ALB. L. REV. 449 (2019), for a recent 
analysis of the role and judicial philosophy of Justice Roberts. 
200.  See generally, Somin, supra note 198. 
201.  Lynn Adelman, Laundering Racism through the Courts, 65 DISSENT, 111, 111 
(2018). 
202.  Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
203.  Id. at 574; see also Somin, supra note 198, at 446-47 (“[Chief Justice] Roberts 
broke with the Court’s other four conservatives and upheld the mandate on the basis that it 
could be interpreted as a tax authorized by Congress’s power to impose taxes.  He claimed 
that the mandate could be considered a tax because an individual’s failure to purchase 
insurance (i) triggered a relatively small monetary fine collected by the Internal Revenue 
Service, (ii) does not qualify as a crime if the fine is paid, and (iii) does not require a showing 
of criminal intent. . . .”). 
204.  Copeland, supra note 198, at 126 (“Medicaid is often cited as one of the 
paradigmatic examples of cooperative federalism in American legislative history.  Indeed, it 
is not hyperbolic to declare Medicaid as the most significant federal-state program in 
American history.  Medicaid relies on states to administer programs that provide access to 
medical care for the indigent and reimburses state governments for a portion of the costs 
incurred.”). 
205.  Nicole Huberfeld, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard & Kevin Outterson, Plunging into 
Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business 
v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1, 5 (2013); see also Copeland, supra note 198, at 95-96 (“The 
Court’s invalidation of parts of the Medicaid Expansion provision was perhaps the biggest 
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In reaching and justifying this conclusion that there was unconstitutional 
coercion, the U.S. Supreme Court misdescribed and misrepresented the facts 
regarding Medicaid expansion, thus implicating the epistemology of 
ignorance.  One of the key reasons the Court had for holding that the 
Medicaid expansion was unconstitutional coercion against the states was that 
the Affordable Care Act “had changed the Medicaid program so dramatically 
as to transform it into an entirely new program.”206  Justice Roberts 
explained: 
 
The Medicaid expansion, however, accomplishes a shift in kind, 
not merely degree.  The original program was designed to cover 
medical services for four particular categories of needs:  the 
disabled, the blind, the elderly, and needy families with dependent 
children. . . . Previous amendments to Medicaid eligibility merely 
altered and expanded the boundaries of these categories.  Under 
the Affordable Care Act, Medicaid is transformed into a program 
to meet the healthcare needs of the entire nonelderly population 
with income below 133 percent of the poverty level.  It is no longer 
a program to care for the neediest among us, but rather an element 
of a comprehensive national plan to provide universal health 
insurance coverage.207 
 
One of the main reasons the court gave for concluding that the 
Affordable Care Act Medicaid expansion was a new program and 
unconstitutionally coercive is that the plurality stated that prior Medicaid 
expansions did not put existing Medicaid funding at risk but placed 
conditions “only [on] the new [Medicaid] funding.”208  This constitutes a 
misdescription of reality implicating the epistemology of ignorance.  
Contrary to the plurality’s position, Congress has expanded Medicaid on a 
number of occasions.209  With respect to each expansion of Medicaid in 1967, 
1972, 1988, and 2003, the states could lose all Medicaid funding if the states 
 
surprise of the otherwise unpredictable decision.  By invalidating the ACA’s grant of authority 
to the Secretary of Health and Human Services to withhold all of a state’s federal Medicaid 
reimbursement as a penalty for not expanding Medicaid eligibility, the Roberts Court became 
the first court to hold a federal spending statute unconstitutionally coercive of state 
governments.  The extent to which the court has transformed the national-state relationship is 
unclear.  What is clear is that the Court’s position is a sharp break from past precedent and 
calls into question the national-state relationship in the administration of one of the central 
pillars of cooperative federalism.”). 
206.  Adelman, supra note 201, at 115. 
207.  567 U.S. at 583. 
208.  Id. at 582. 
209.  Huberfeld et al., supra note 205, at 20-21. 
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failed to expand Medicaid coverage.210  For instance, in 1967, Congress 
expanded Medicaid to broaden coverage for children.211  In 1972, Congress 
amended Medicaid by creating a federal Supplemental Security Income 
(“SSI”) program which replaced a program for the aged, blind and 
disabled.212  In 1988, Congress expanded Medicaid coverage by creating 
“uniform mandatory eligibility categories up to 133% FPL for pregnant 
women and children from birth to age 5, and up to 100% FPL for children 
ages six to eighteen.”213  These changes represent a major increase in the 
number of people who were covered by Medicaid.214  In 2003, Congress 
expanded Medicaid by creating “coverage for outpatient prescription drugs 
in the Medicare program.”215  Given all of this, Professors Huberfeld, 
Leonard and Outterson conclude that “the Roberts plurality was historically 
inaccurate when it suggested that prior Medicaid expansions were voluntary 
or did not put already existing program funds at risk.”216  Moreover, these 
authors conclude that “[t]hese changes have not been mere tinkering but 
significant expansion [of Medicaid] in both kind and degree.”217 
Under these circumstances, the Affordable Care Act’s expansion of 
Medicaid represented not a new program but just another expansion of the 
original Medicaid program “by extending coverage to all citizens and legal 
residents with incomes up to 133% of the Federal Poverty Level.”218  Justice 
Roberts argued that the Affordable Care Act represented a different program 
in kind “because unlike the pre-ACA Medicaid, the Medicaid expansion 
‘does not care for the neediest among us.’”219  This, however, was a 
misrepresentation of reality, raising the spectre of the epistemology of 
ignorance.  The pre-ACA Medicaid categories of beneficiaries all covered 
poor persons—e.g., poor senior citizens and poor disabled persons.220  The 
category created by the Affordable Care Act also covered poor persons, 
namely, poor adults.221  Given this, contrary to Justice Robert’s position, the 
Affordable Care Act expansion did not represent a new program differing in 
kind because “the basic function of Medicaid, both before and after the 
expansion, was the same:  to provide healthcare to poor people.”222  As 
 
210.  Huberfeld et al., supra note 205, at 21-24. 
211.  Huberfeld et al., supra note 205, at 21-22. 
212.  Huberfeld et al., supra note 205, at 22. 
213.  Huberfeld et al., supra note 205, at 23. 
214.  Id. 
215.  Id. 
216.  Huberfeld et al., supra note 205, at 24. 
217.  Id. 
218.  Huberfeld et al., supra note 205, at 25. 
219.  Id. at 25 (quoting Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 635 (2012)). 
220.  Huberfeld et al., supra note 205, at 25. 
221.  Id. 
222.  Adelman, supra note 201. 
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Professors Huberfeld, Leonard and Outterson explained: 
 
The Medicaid expansion was significant.  But on closer 
examination, it was just another step in another step in a regular 
process of incrementalist modification to the existing program, 
akin to prior amendments over the past half century.  Each of the 
prior coverage expansions, redefinitions of eligibility, and funding 
adjustments have changed the terms of the cooperative 
arrangement between the federal government and participating 
states.  The ACA’s Medicaid amendments were no more dramatic 
than these earlier changes.  The Court’s claim that the expansion 
was an entirely new program does not square with the historical 
record.223 
 
Since the Court decided that the Medicaid expansion was 
unconstitutional coercion, it had to devise a remedy.  Instead of holding the 
entire Affordable Care Act unconstitutional, the Court simply made the 
Medicaid expansion optional for the states.224 
The operation of the epistemology of ignorance regarding the 
Affordable Care Act Medicaid expansion has resulted in the subordination 
and oppression of African-Americans.  The NFIB ruling making Medicaid 
expansion optional for the states resulted in almost every southern state 
opting out of the Affordable Care Act Medicaid expansion.225  In declining 
to participate in the Medicaid expansion, these states “severely restrict[ed] 
social-service benefits to their poorest citizens, most of whom are African-
Americans.”226  Moreover, as Stephen Griffin has observed this “southern 
failure” in the wake of the Sebelius decision was “both predictable and very 
unfortunate in terms of its impact on health outcomes for all the poor in the 
southern states, but especially for racial minorities.”227 
The Sebelius court had in the record a report by the Kaiser Family 
Foundation which showed that the southern states had “extremely restrictive 
 
223.  Huberfeld et al., supra note 205, at 29. 
224.  Huberfeld et al., supra note 205, at 40.  
225.  Adelman, supra note 201; see also Somin, supra note 198, at 447 (“Nonetheless, 
this part of the decision turned out to be enormously consequential.  As of early 2016, nineteen 
Republican-controlled state governments have rejected the Medicaid expansion, including 
such major states as Texas and Florida. . . .  This development affects medical care for millions 
of people and redirects many billions of dollars of government spending.  The Court’s 
invalidation of the ACA’s mandatory Medicaid expansion is probably the most important 
ruling invalidating a federal statute on federalism grounds since the New Deal”).   
226.  Adelman, supra note 201. 
227.  Stephen Griffin, The Tragedy of the Medicaid Expansion (Part II), BALKINIZATION 
(Mar. 4, 2017), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2017/03/the-tragedy-of-medicaid-expansion-
part.html. 
7 - MARTINEZ_HRPLJ_V17_2 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/30/2020  3:06 PM 
546 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY LAW JOURNAL  Vol. XVII 
Medicaid eligibility standards” reflecting a history of racial discrimination 
dating from the era of slavery that “severely restrict[ed] social service 
benefits to their poorest citizens, most of whom are African-American.”228  
“Medicaid ‘has greatly increased access to healthcare and has significantly 
improved the health outcomes of low-income Americans by virtually every 
conceivable measure—including infant mortality, maternal mortality, 
disease incidence and life expectancy.’”229  Thus, the failure to expand 
Medicaid, resulting in part from misdescriptions and misrepresentations of 
reality in Sebelius as predicted by the epistemology of ignorance, will result 
in the “suffering and premature deaths of millions of citizens, many of them 
poor African-Americans.”230 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Shelby County v. Holder231 
provides another example of the epistemology of ignorance operating in the 
context of federalism and reinforcing the subordination of racial minorities.  
In Shelby County, the Supreme Court overturned a significant portion of 
Voting Rights Act of 1965.  Congress promulgated the Voters Rights Act as 
part of its effort to carry out the Fifteenth Amendment’s232 outlawing of 
discrimination on the basis of race in the area of voting.233  In this regard, 
Section 5 of the Voters Rights Act required certain states to obtain approval 
from federal officials—the U.S. attorney general or the federal district court 
in Washington, D.C.—before changing their laws dealing with voting.234  The 
 
228.  Adelman, supra note 201. 
229.  Griffin, supra note 227 (quoting SHANNA ROSE, FINANCING MEDICAID:  
FEDERALISM AND THE GROWTH OF AMERICA’S HEALTH CARE SAFETY NET (2013)). 
230.  Mark A. Hall, States’ Decisions Not to Expand Medicaid, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1459, 
1477 (2014). 
231.  570 U.S. 529 (2013). 
232.  The Fifteenth Amendment was one of three constitutional amendments that 
Congress enacted “at the close of the Civil War” for the purpose of “preventing ‘Southerners 
from re-establishing white supremacy.’”  Adam Bolotin, Out of Touch: Shelby County v. 
Holder and the Callous Effects of Chief Justice Roberts Equal State Sovereignty, 49 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 751, 753 (2016). 
233.  570 U.S. at 536–37.  “In an effort to remediate the recurring problem of racial 
discrimination in voting against blacks, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Voting Rights 
Act into law on August 6, 1965.  As stated by President Johnson, the Act was ‘a triumph for 
freedom as huge as any victory that has ever been won on any battlefield.’”  Ashley M. White, 
The Demolition of the Voting Rights Act:  The Combat to Overcome Voter Suppression of 
Disenfranchised Citizens — Shelby County v. Holder, 5 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 193, 200 
(2015). 
234.  See Paul F. Hancock & Lora L. Tredway, The Bailout Standard of the Voting Rights 
Act:  An Incentive to End Discrimination, 17 URB. LAW. 379, 386 (1985) (in order to make 
sure “that states and counties did not implement new methods of racial discrimination in 
voting . . . Congress . . . adopted the provisions contained in Section 5 of the Act, requiring 
each targeted or ‘covered’ jurisdiction, if it wished to implement a voting standard, practice or 
procedure” to secure approval from “the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia” or “the attorney general of the United States”). 
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States would then have to establish that the proposed changes did not prevent 
or limit the right to vote on grounds of race.235  In Shelby County, the Supreme 
Court invalidated as unconstitutional Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act 
which sets out the coverage formula for the preclearance requirement in 
Section 5 of the Voter’s Rights Act.  The Court held that the coverage formula 
was unconstitutional because it violated the “fundamental principle of equal 
sovereignty among the states” in as much as it was not “grounded in current 
conditions” or “justified by current needs” and was instead “based on 40-
year-old data.”236 
The court’s decision in Shelby County provides another example of the 
epistemology of ignorance as the court, in substance, actively produced 
ignorance as to whether there was a current need for the preclearance 
requirement.  In her dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsberg set out the current 
facts or conditions that continued to justify the need for the preclearance 
requirement: (1) states “continued to submit, in large numbers, proposed 
changes to voting laws that the Attorney General declined to approve, 
auguring that barriers to minority voting would quickly resurface were the 
preclearance remedy eliminated; (2) even though there were increasing 
numbers of minorities registering to vote and voting, “other measures may 
be resorted to which would dilute increasing minority voting strength”; (3) 
Congress compiled an extensive 15,000 page record containing “countless 
‘examples of flagrant racial discrimination’ since the last reauthorization . . . 
[including] systematic evidence that ‘intentional racial discrimination in 
voting remains so serious and widespread in covered jurisdictions that 
Section 5 preclearance is still needed.’”237  Thus, the Court “ignored the 
extensive legislative record compiled by Congress establishing the 
persistence of voting discrimination in the covered jurisdictions.”238 
Given the demonstrated continuing need for preclearance, it was 
 
235.  42 U.S.C. § 1973. 
236.  570 U.S. at 542, 544, 556–557.  “These categorical judgments suggest the view that 
racial discrimination in voting is naturally isolated in time and scope.  The majority’s analysis 
forecloses the possibility that the historical discrimination in the covered jurisdictions involved 
particular institutions designed to produce long term unlawful political power, such as 
especially racially identified and racially polarized political party structure.”  Martha T. 
McCluskey, Toward A Fundamental Right to Evade Law?  The Rule of Power in Shelby 
County and State Farm, 17 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 216, 221 (2015). 
237.  570 U.S. at 565.  See also McCluskey, supra note 236, at 222 (“In fact, Ginsberg’s 
dissent noted Congress considered evidence in 2006 showing an increase in voting changes in 
the colored jurisdictions deemed objectionable because of racial discrimination in the period 
from 1982 to 2004 compared with the earlier period of enforcement from 1965 to 1982”). 
238.  Adelman, supra note 201; see also Angelica Rolong, 46 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 519, 
547 (2014) (“The majority in Shelby County failed to see the copious amount of evidence 
gathered by Congress and ignored the purpose of the movement that led to the passage of the 
[Voting Rights Amendment]”). 
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reasonably foreseeable that southern states would enact laws intended to limit 
the vote of racial minorities.  For example, shortly after the Shelby County 
decision, “the North Carolina State Legislature passed a ‘monster voter 
suppression law that required strict photo ID, cut early voting and eliminated 
same day registration and pre-registration for 16 and 17 year olds.’”239  The 
law “‘excluded many of the alternative photo IDs used by African 
Americans’” and “retained only the kinds of IDs that white North Carolinians 
were more likely to possess.’”  Indeed, the Fourth Circuit bluntly states “that 
the law targeted African Americans ‘with almost surgical precision.’”240  
Similarly, shortly after the Shelby County ruling, “Texas announced that its 
previously blocked discriminatory voting laws would immediately go into 
effect.”241  Indeed, since the Supreme Court’s decision, fourteen states have 
passed laws limiting voting which might not have satisfied the preclearance 
requirements if Section 5 had been upheld.242  In other words, the Shelby 
County “decision opened the floodgates, enabling states . . . with the most 
egregious histories of discriminating against the voting rights of minorities 
to start discriminating all over again: and thereby “do great harm to the voting 
rights of African-Americans in the South. . . .”243 
Given the extremely negative results for racial minorities resulting from 
the judicial enforcement of federalism in Sebelius and Shelby County, these 
decisions powerfully support the general view that “federalism is a disaster 
for racial and ethnic minority groups.”244  The epistemology of ignorance has 
aided the use of federalism to subordinate persons of color. 
 
 
 
 
 
239.  Matthew Murillo, Did Voter Suppression Win President Trump the Election?: The 
Decimation of the Voting Rights Act and the Importance of Section 5, 51 U.S.F. L. REV. 591, 
606-07 (2017). 
240.  N.C. State Conf. of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 214-215 (4th Cir. 2016). 
241.  Adelman, supra note 201. 
242.  Murillo, supra note 239, at 607-08. 
243.  Adelman, supra note 201; see also Rolong, supra note 238, at 559 (“The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Shelby County will create consequences for Texas voters, as well as voters 
in other formerly covered jurisdictions.  As a result of this decision, minority voters should 
expect to see the imposition of more second-generation barriers, especially on local levels 
where there is little oversight”). 
244.  Ilya Somin, Making Federalism Great Again: How the Trump Administration’s 
Attack on Sanctuary Cities Unintentionally Strengthened Judicial Protection for State 
Autonomy, 97 TEX. L. REV. 1247, 1291 (2019); see also McCluskey, supra note 235, at 228 
(“Shelby County may herald . . . a revival of an older constitutional ideal assuming that law’s 
protection normally and naturally must lead to accommodate the weight of unequal economic 
and racial power”). 
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VIII.   LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, THE OUTLAWING OF 
ETHNIC STUDIES IN ARIZONA, AND THE 
EPISTEMOLOGY OF IGNORANCE 
 
Another way in which the epistemology of ignorance is implicated in 
law is in the area of legal scholarship.  In particular, ignorance has been 
produced in the area of law through the exclusion or marginalization of racial 
minorities in the context of legal scholarship.  In a now famous article, 
Richard Delgado found that “white scholars” had engaged in “systematic 
occupation of, and exclusion of, minority scholars from the central areas of 
civil rights scholarship.”245  This exclusion resulted in certain defects, 
including defects in knowledge.246  For instance white scholars “were 
unaware of basic facts about the situation in which minority persons live or 
ways in which they see the world.”247  Delgado found that “the exclusion of 
minority writing about key issues of race law . . . causes bluntings, skewings 
and omissions in the literature dealing with race, racism and American 
law.”248  In a follow-up article, written about ten years later, Delgado found 
that minority authors “are still not being integrated fully or equally into the 
colloquies, exchange, and dialogues of legal scholarship.”249  He concluded 
that “imperial scholarship will continue to be with us a long time.”250  Indeed, 
Professor Juan Perea has recently confirmed Delgado’s prediction: 
 
Thirty years after he wrote his first Imperial Scholar article, the 
situation is pretty much unchanged since Richard wrote the 
Imperial Scholar Revisited.  There are certainly more scholars of 
color in academia today, publishing and adding to our wealth of 
knowledge.  Yet in the main writings on race remain marginalized.  
The knowledge we have produced has neither been integrated into 
 
245.  Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561, 566 (1984) 
(Leading critical race theorist Professor Derrick Bell has called this Imperial Scholar article 
“‘an intellectual hand grenade, tossed over the wall of the establishment as a form of academic 
protest.’”). Juan F. Perea, Of Word Grenades and Impermeable Walls: Imperial Scholarship 
Then and Now, 33 LAW & INEQ. 443, 447 (2015) (quoting Jon Wiener, Law Profs Fight the 
Power, NATION, Sept. 1989 at 246 (quoting Derrick Bell); see also Robert S. Chang, Richard 
Delgado and the Politics of Citation, 11 BERKLEY J. AFR. AM. L. & POL’Y 28 (2009) (“[The 
Imperial Scholar article] created a firestorm of sorts with what one critic called a ‘serious 
charge of invidious racism on the part of respected legal scholars’”). 
246.  Delgado, supra note 245, at 566-73. 
247.  Id. at 567-68. 
248.  Id. at 573; see also Chang, supra note 245, at 30-31 (The “exclusion of minority 
scholars” leads to the “distortion of legal knowledge and limited vision of justice”). 
249.  Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar Revisited: How to Marginalize Outsider 
Writing, Ten Years Later, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1372 (1992). 
250.  Id. at 1372. 
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the canon, nor has it had its proper influence in the realms of 
today’s imperial scholars.251 
 
This production of ignorance in the context of legal scholarship has 
resulted in the subordination of racial minorities because it leads to 
ineffective advocacy of the rights and interests of racial minorities and sets 
up barriers to advancement of racial minorities in the legal academy in terms 
of obtaining tenure and promotion.252 
Similarly, the dominant group also has actively sought to produce 
ignorance in seeking to outlaw ethnic studies253 in Arizona.  The Tucson 
Arizona Unified School District established a program of Mexican-American 
Studies in 1998.254  This Mexican-American studies program was very 
successful and produced high academic achievement for Latino students who 
participated in the program.255  Indeed, these Latino students “surpassed all 
other students on the state’s graduation exam and graduated at a higher rate 
than their Anglo peers” and “enrolled in college at a percentage that is 129 
times greater than the national average for Chicano/a students.”256  This 
program developed knowledge based on “the Chicano/Latino Voice, 
experience, perspective, and history.”257  Led by the Arizona State 
Superintendent of Instruction, Tom Horne, who claimed that the Mexican-
American studies program “promoted the separation of the races, ethnic 
solidarity, hatred of whites, and the overthrow of the U.S. government,” the 
 
251.  Perea, supra note 245, at 447. 
252.  See Chang, supra note 245, at 30-34. 
253.  “The Ethnic Studies movement constituted a broad effort to challenge the 
constricted disciplinary perspectives that have historically defined the Western academy.  The 
appearance of a multitude of subaltern standpoints from which new knowledges, histories, and 
political futurities were being generated threw into question the boundaries and procedures 
that had worked to contain, discipline, and legitimize the Western sciences.” Alex J. Armonda, 
Advancing an (Im)possible Alternative: Ethnic Studies in Neoliberal Times, 7 TEX. EDUC. REV. 
30, 31 (2019). 
254.  See Lupe S. Salinas, Arizona’s Desire to Eliminate Ethnic Studies Programs: A 
Time to Take the “Pill” and Engage Latino Students in Critical Education About Their 
History, 14 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 301, 305 (2011). The Mexican-American Studies Program 
was developed as a result of litigation brought to desegregate the Tucson Unified School 
District. M. Isabel Medina, Silencing Talk About Race: Why Arizona’s Prohibition of Ethnic 
Studies Violates Equality, 45 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 47, 67-72 (2017). 
255.  Salinas, supra note 254, at 301-302. 
256.  Salinas, supra note 254, at 302. 
257.  Salinas, supra note 254, at 301-302; see also Armonda, supra note 253, at 31 
(“[W]e must frame the push for Ethnic Studies as but one important expression of a broader 
effort to challenge the coloniality of the academy and academic knowledge as such.  This is a 
project that aims to disrupt the ontologies, epistemologies, and dominant ideologies that are 
positioned in schools as neutral, objective, ahistorical, or atheoretical[.]”). 
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Arizona legislature enacted H.R. 2281 outlawing ethnic studies.258  The 
statute provided:  “The legislature finds and declares that public school pupils 
should be taught to treat and value each other as individuals and not be taught 
to resent or hate other races or classes of people.”259  The statute further 
provided: 
 
A school district or charter school in this state shall not 
include in its program of instruction any course or classes 
that: 
(1) Promote the overthrow of the United States 
government. 
(2) Promote resentment toward a race or class of people. 
(3) Are designed primarily for pupils of a particular 
ethnic group. 
(4) Advocate ethnic solidarity instead of the treatment 
of pupils as individuals.260 
 
Finally, the statute provided a penalty for districts that refused to comply 
with the requirements of the anti-ethnic studies statute in that ten percent of 
the monthly apportionment of state aid to the district would be withheld.261  
H.B. 2281 was designed to outlaw Mexican-American studies in Arizona.262  
Following the enactment of the statute, Superintendent Tom Horne 
announced that the Tucson Mexican-American studies program failed to 
comply with the statutory requirements.263  In response to the Superintendent, 
the Tucson school board ordered the teachers in the Mexican-American 
studies program “to shift to other subjects or resign.”264  The authorities also 
confiscated “textbooks and other materials” which were used in the program 
 
258.  Salinas, supra note 254, at 304. 
259.  Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 15-111. 
260.  Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 15-112(A). 
261.  Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 15-112(B). 
262.  See Richard Delgado, Precious Knowledge:  State Bans on Ethnic Studies, Book 
Traffickers (Librotraficantes), and a New Type of Race Trial, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1513, 1522 
(2013); see also Jessica A. Solyom & Bryan McKinley Jones Brayboy, Memento Mori: 
Policing the Minds and Bodies of Indigenous Latinas/os in Arizona, 42 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 
473, 478 (2012) (“Arizona House Bill 2281, signed into law on May 11, 2010, is legislation 
intended to target racialized citizens and legal residents” and was “created to specifically target 
the Mexican-American Raza Studies Program in the Tucson Unified School District[.]”). 
263.  Delgado, supra note 262, at 1523; See also Kevin Terry, Community Dreams and 
Nightmares: Arizona, Ethnic Studies and the Continued Relevance of Derrick Bell’s Interest-
Convergence Thesis, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1483, 1500 (2013) (“In December of 2010, Horne 
issued findings that the TUSD’s Program violated [H.B. 2281] because the program was 
‘designed primarily for pupils of a particular ethnic group’”). 
264.  Delgado, supra note 262, at 1523. 
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“in front of crying students.”265  Obviously, outlawing ethnic studies 
programs which were developing knowledge based on the Mexican-
American experience, is an example of the dominant group actively 
producing ignorance and suppressing knowledge as predicted by the 
epistemology of ignorance theorists.  This suppression of knowledge and 
production of ignorance in the context of ethnic studies has enabled the 
subordination of racial minorities by “imped[ing] the academic and economic 
success” of people of color in an effort to “protect the economic and powerful 
interest of whites.”266 
 
IX.   CONCLUSION 
 
In this article, I have sought to reveal—through a series of important 
examples—how the dominant group has constructed an epistemology of 
ignorance in the area of race and the law.  This epistemology of ignorance 
requires the dominant group—in order to maintain their socially dominant 
position—to “engage in a significant degree of misunderstanding, 
misinterpretation and misrepresentation on matters related to race.”267  In 
particular, I have argued that the dominant group has constructed an 
epistemology of ignorance (1) in the area of law with respect to Native 
Americans; (2) in the area of law with respect to Mexican-Americans; (3) in 
the area of employment discrimination law; (4) in the area of immigration 
law and policy in the Trump era; (5) in the area of federalism in recent United 
States Supreme Court cases; and (6) in the areas of legal scholarship and in 
the outlawing of ethnic studies in Arizona.  I also have argued that this 
production of ignorance has helped enable whites to maintain their socially 
dominant position in American society. 
 
 
265.  Id. 
266.  Solyom & Brayboy, supra note 262, at 502. 
267.  Mason, supra note 7, at 302. 
